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Forging the New Water Law:
Public Regulation of
"Proprietary" Groundwater Rights
ANTONIO

By
ROSSMANN*
and

MICHAEL J. STEEL"

More than two centuries ago, Lord Blackstone implicitly recognized the inherent authority of the state to govern the private use of
water. No person could claim exclusive ownership of water; the public
in common controlled it.
[There are some few things which, notwithstanding the general introduction and continuance of property, must still unavoidably remain in common; being such wherein nothing but the usufructory
property is being capable of being had ....
[Water is a moveable, wandering thing, and must of necessity continue in common by the law of nature; so that I can only have a
temporary, transient, usufructory property therein .... I
Although Blackstone's words often have found expression in theories relating to water use,2 in practice, the law has eschewed rather than
embraced the theory of public regulation in the public interest. Until
recently, Anglo-American law generally has neither identified nor pro* Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
A.B., 1963, Harvard College; J.D. 1971, Harvard Law School. Member, California, New
York, and District of Columbia Bars. Professor Rossmann has acted as special counsel to
Inyo County in the groundwater disputes described in this Article.
**
Member, Third Year Class.
1. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *14, *18.
2. See, e.g., Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853) ("Mhe right of property in water
is usufructuary, and consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its use.")
(emphasis in original). In California, the state constitution specifies that water use must be
"reasonable and beneficial. . . in the interest of the people and for the public welfare."
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; see also MODEL WATER CODE §§ 1.02(l), 1.03(4) (1972). The California Water Code reiterates the policy that all water is "the property of the people of the
State." CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971) (originally enacted as Act of April 8, 1911, ch.
407, § 1, 1911 Cal. Stat. 821).
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tected public values in the management of water resources. 3 Rather,
the legal system has directed its energies to the piecemeal resolution of
individual, private disputes. 4 Today, as undeveloped resources diminish and demands for these resources increase, Blackstone's words can
no longer be ignored; his words must be forged into a new water law
that recognizes and protects the public interest.
California's present groundwater law reveals the difficult burden
of implementing the state's constitutional mandate that "the conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable, and
beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for the public
welfare."' 5 The frustration of judicial attempts to enforce the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)6 as a groundwater management
device,7 coupled with the recent failure of the legislature to effect comprehensive statutory reform of California's water law, 8 demonstrate the
need for direct local regulation of groundwater resources to ensure that
private water use conforms to the public good.
The ultimate consequence of a water law system based upon private rights and dispute resolution has become manifest in the Owens
Valley, in inyo County, California. 9 As an integral part of its construction and operation of the Los Angeles Aqueduct during the past seventy-five years, Los Angeles has purchased most of the private land
and water rights in the valley, on the premise that a lack of competing
proprietary water rights would eliminate all restraints on the city's ambitious extraction program. Completion of a second aqueduct in 1970,
and the attempt by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
3. See Weatherford, Legal Aspects of Interregional Water Diversion, 15 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1299, 1302-03 (1968).

4.

Referring to Blackstone's distinction between the temporary, "usufructory" nature

of rights to the use of water and the absolute nature of real property rights, one commentator

noted that "[it is difficult to imagine that the 'pretty distinction' has ever played any real
part in the practical solution of even a single private controversy." Hanks, The Law of Water
in New Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 621, 628 (1968) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as

Hanks].
5. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
6. CAL. Pun. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
7. See notes 88-131 & accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 132-57 & accompanying text infra.
9. Owens Valley, located east of the Sierra Nevada, drains a long, narrow basin, extending approximately 120 miles from the Mono Divide to Owens Lake. The Sierra forms
the western wall of the basin with the parallel White and Inyo Mountains enclosing the
eastern side. A plateau divides the basin into two relatively flat valleys: Long Valley to the
north and Owens Valley to the south. The elevation of this basin varies from about 8,000
feet at the head of Long Valley to about 3,500 feet at Owens Lake, the southernmost point in
Owens Valley and the natural terminus of the Owens River. See V. OSTROM, WATER &
POLITICS 11 (1953).
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(LADWP) to double its extractions from the Eastern Sierra at the environmental, cultural, and economic expense of Inyo County's residents,
underscore the necessity for a groundwater law that incorporates the
nonproprietary interests of society.
This Article examines a concrete effort to preserve the public's interest in water in the face of an extreme exercise of proprietary rights.
Inyo County has enacted an ordinance to regulate proprietary water
rights in harmony with the inchoate public rights enunciated by Blackstone. The Article describes and evaluates the legal and policy bases of
Inyo County's recently adopted program of local groundwater planning and management. First, the Article examines the evolution
of
proprietary groundwater law, emphasizing its development in California. Next, the Article describes the contemporary Owens Valley dispute
and the alternative of state-supervised groundwater regulation. Finally, the Article presents the Inyo County ordinance and examines its
implications for future groundwater resource management.
The Evolution of Proprietary Groundwater Law
To the scientist, all water is part of the hydrologic cycle, whether it
flows in a river or percolates underground. To the lawyer, however,
water is divided and subdivided into categories, each governed by its
own set of principles. 10 The first division separates surface water from
that found below the surface of the earth." Surface water has been
subdivided as diffused water, as water in watercourses, lakes, and
ponds, or as springwaters and other waters at the surface. 12 Subsurface
water has been categorized either as flowing in defined subterranean
3
channels or as groundwater.'
This categorization of water sources resulted from a lack of hydrological knowledge when the current legal system took shape.' 4 Courts
in early water law cases admitted ignorance of the dynamics of the resource.' 5 In California, the burden of resolving groundwater disputes
10. See Hanks, supra note 4, at 626.
11. See 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 21
(1971).
12. See id See generaljy I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 52.1 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
13. See generally I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 52.2 (R. Clark ed. 1967); 2 W.
HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS INTHE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 631-34 (1974).
14. "The conceptual structure [of water law] is a composite of pragmatism, incomplete
scientific data, and precedent." Hanks, supra note 4, at 626.
15. See, eg., Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1233 (Ex. 1843): "No proprietor
knows what proportion of water is taken from beneath his own soil; how much he gives
originally, or how much he transmits only, or how much he receives."

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[VoL 33

has fallen primarily upon the courts; 16 rules framed within this adversary structure therefore established legal precedents that perpetuate scientifically unfounded distinctions.
The particular situation of the Owens Valley in Inyo County further complicates the already imprecise interplay of hydrology and law.
First, one extractor, the city of Los Angeles, owns virtually all the private land and thus controls virtually all the private legal claims to
water from that basin.1 7 Second, unlike most groundwater basins suffering extraction-related problems, Inyo County's Owens Basin is not
necessarily overdrafted according to the traditional standard, which is
whether the average annual extractions from the entire basin exceed
the average annual recharge to that basin. 18 Rather, environmental
damage results from the sudden lowering of the normally high shallow
groundwater table at the crest of the basin-the narrow zone of water
upon which the flora and fauna of the desert valley rely.' 9
Overlying Use
The 1843 English decision inActon v. Blundell 20 ignored the policy
enunciated by Blackstone and established the "English Rule" of absolute ownership of groundwater. The defendant, Blundell, by pumping
all the water underlying his land to facilitate his coal mining operation,
left his neighbor Acton's well dry. In resolving the limited conflict between these two parties, the court relied upon two major premises:
(1) a landowner owns everything from the center of the earth to the
heavens, and (2) because water is a "moveable, wandering thing," the
2
courts should not attempt to apportion the privilege to use water. '
Thus, the court granted landowner Blundell an unlimited right to ex16.

See A. SCHNEIDER, GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA 3 (Governor's

Comm'n to Review California Water Rights Law Staff Paper No. 2, July 1977). California,
unlike most western states, has no comprehensive groundwater control statutes. See 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 414 n.27 (R. Clark ed. 1972).
17. DEP'T OF WATER & POWER, CITY OF Los ANGELES, INCREASED PUMPING OF THE
OWENS VALLEY GROUNDWATER BASIN fig. 1-1 (1978).
18. "Overdraft" is traditionally defined as the condition resulting when extractions exceed safe yield plus temporary surplus. "Temporary surplus" is the amount of water that
may be extracted from an aquifer to provide storage space for surface water that would be
wasted during wet years if it could not be stored in the basin. City of Los Angeles v. City of

San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 277-78, 537 P.2d 1250, 1309, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 60 (1975). See
generally A. SCHNEIDER, GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA (Governor's Comm'n to
Review California Water Rights Law Staff Paper No. 2, July 1977).
19. See P. WILLIAMS, CHANGES IN THE OWENS VALLEY SHALLOW GROUNDWATER
LEVELS FROM 1970 TO 1978 (1978).
20. 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843).
21. Id at 1233-35.
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tract water from beneath his land for any purpose.22 By implication,
however, the court suggested that Acton's rights also were unqualified;
thus, the plaintiff and the defendant each held absolute rights to the
water under his own land, but held no rights in the water underlying
the other's land. The consequence of this rule contradicted each of the
conclusions reached by Blackstone; it left each landowner unrestricted,
but simultaneously unprotected, in the use of groundwater. Such a result ignored groundwater's fundamental character as a resource that in
a single body often crosses boundaries of real property ownership and
ignored the fact that the resource is finite.
American courts have modified the absolute ownership approach
to groundwater use; the water may not be used off the land from which
it is pumped if this use injures others whose lands overlie the common
supply.23 Thus, the use of groundwater generally must be a reasonable
use, "limited to purposes incident to the beneficial enjoyment of the
land from which [the waters] are obtained." 24 Although early California courts applied the English rule of absolute ownership of groundwater,25 in 1903, the California Supreme Court rejected this doctrine.
In Katz v. Wakinshaw,26 the court established the doctrine of correla22. This rule was later modified to impose liability upon a landowner who maliciously
or negligently extracted water. See, e.g., Bartlett v. O'Connor, 102 Cal. xvii, 4 Cal. Unrep.
610, 36 P. 513 (1894); W. HuTrcmNs, Tim CALiFoRNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTs 430 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as HuTcHiNs]; 5 R. POWELL & P. RoHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
725, at 420 (1980) [hereinafter cited as POWELL & ROHAN].
23. See Jarvis v. State Land Dep't, 106 Ariz. 506, 508, 479 P.2d 169, 171 (1970);
Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 134, 14 A.2d 87, 90 (1940).
24. Rothrauffv. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 134, 14 A.2d 87, 90 (1940); see
also Jarvis v. State Land Dep't, 106 Ariz. 506, 508-09, 479 P.2d 169, 171-72 (1970) (citing
cases in thirteen other jurisdictions); Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 134, 74 P. 766, 771
(1903); 5 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 22, 726, at 422-24 (1980).
25. The first California legislature, meeting five months before admission of the state to
the Union, adopted the English common law as the rule of decision in all state courts. Act of
April 13, 1850, ch. 95, 1850 Cal. Stat. 219 (current version at CAL. Civ. CODE § 22.2 (West
1954)).
In 1871, the California Supreme Court followed Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223
(Ex. 1843), and held. "Water filtrating or percolating in the soil belongs to the owner of the
freehold-like the rocks and minerals found there." Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303, 309
(1871). The court adhered to this view as late as 1899: 'Tercolating waters are part of the
soil and belong to the owner of the soil. He may impound them at will, and the proprietor of
the lower lands injuriously affected cannot be heard to complain." Vineland Irrigation Dist.
v. Azusa Irrigation Co., 126 Cal. 486, 494, 58 P. 1057, 1059 (1899). This concept of absolute
ownership was limited only by the qualification that, in depriving others of the use of water,
the overlying owner could not be actuated solely by malice. See HuTcHiNs, supra note 22,
at 430.
26. 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903).
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27
tive rights. Under this doctrine, as developed in subsequent case law,
each owner of land overlying a groundwater supply enjoys the privilege 28 of making reasonable and beneficial use of that supply of water
in connection with that land.29 This "correlative" privilege is shared
equally by all other owners of land overlying the same groundwater
supply. 30 Thus, in periods of shortage, the privilege of withdrawing
water is apportioned pro rata among the various overlying privilege
31
holders.
In imposing the standard of reasonableness on the overlying owners' privilege of use, the court brought to groundwater regulation a rule
of pragmatic flexibility. This flexibility was first recognized in the
"first-in-time, first-in-right" rule governing the appropriation of surface
water. 32 Early California courts nonetheless erroneously assumed that
the groundwater supply was sufficient to meet all overlying needs, and
refused to apply the rule of reasonableness in groundwater in the few
33
cases involving actual or potential extractor disputes.

Appropriation of Surplus Groundwater
Groundwater is subject to a claim of prior appropriation if it is
surplus to the reasonable and beneficial needs of the overlying owners
34
and can be used reasonably and beneficially on non-overlying lands.

This appropriative right may be asserted by anyone able to place sur27. See generaly HUTCHINS, supra note 22, at 442.
28. Professor Powell notes that the water users' interest in water may more accurately
be characterized as a privilege than as a right. See 5 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 22,
710, at 350 n.3; see also Hanks, supra note 4, at 628; Kenyon, What Can A RparianProprietor Do?, 21 MINN. L. REV. 512, 514-16 (1937).
29. Reasonableness of a use refers to the manner as opposed to the purpose of use.
Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351,367, 40 P.2d 486, 491 (1935); see also City of Lodi
v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 7 Cal. 2d 316, 60 P.2d 486 (1936). The beneficial character of a
use is determined by reference to the purpose of the use. See Joslin v. Main Mun. Water
Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 140-41, 429 P.2d 889, 894-95, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 383 (1967); Peabody v.
City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 369, 40 P.2d 486, 492 (1935).
30. See HUTCHINS, supra note 22, at 431, 436-41.
31. See City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 15, 198 P. 784, 788
(1921); Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 135-36, 74 P. 766, 772 (1903); HUTCHINS, supra
note 22, at 440.
32. The "first-in-time, first-in-right" appropriation law originated in early California
mining custom. See generally Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457-58 (1897); Irwin v. Phillips,
5 Cal. 140 (1855); HUTCHINS, supra note 22, at 41-43. The state sanctioned the miner's
custom in the California Practice Act of 1851, ch. 5, § 62, 1851 Cal. Stat. 149.
33. See, e.g., Miller & Lux v. Madera Canal & Irrig. Co., 155 Cal. 59, 64, 99 P. 502,
511-12 (1909); Huffner v. Sawday, 153 Cal. 86, 91, 94 P. 424, 426 (1908). See note 25 supra.
34. See generally HUTCHINS, supra note 22, at 454-61.
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plus waters in beneficial use.35 In contrast to correlative rights, the

most recent appropriators must give up their uses first in36 times of
shortage; no pro rata sharing protects subsequent exporters.
As between appropriators, priority in time applies; the appropriator "first in time" is entitled to all reasonably and beneficially used surAn
plus water, to the exclusion of subsequent appropriators.
appropriator whose use follows that of an overlying owner is limited to
waters surplus to the overlying landowner's use.37 If an appropriator's

use precedes that of an overlying landowner, however, the landowner's
' 38
privilege is limited to a "quantity necessary for use."
This rule preferring use by overlying owners operates to preserve
the finite resource. Appropriations, or extractions for export, actually
withdraw water from the basin. In contrast, uses by overlying owners
at least partially replenish the basin. 39 In granting an invariable and
absolute priority to overlying users, however, some courts have failed
to consider the relative social utility of specific extraction programs and
the environmental damage or benefit that they may create.
Non-doctrinal Solutions
In 1949, the California Supreme Court began a new era in water
rights dispute resolution with the pragmatic decision of City of
Pasadenav. City ofAlhambra.40 In Pasadena,extractors in the heavily
overdrafted Raymond Basin sought an adjudication of their rights to
the local groundwater supply. In holding that extractions- by appropriators in the immediately preceding five-year period would establish
prescriptive rights,41 the California Supreme Court adopted a practical,
35. See City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 925, 207 P.2d 17, 28
(1949); Alpaugh Irrig. Dist. v. County of Kern, 113 Cal. App. 2d 286, 292, 248 P.2d 117, 120
(1952). See generally HtrrcHINS, supra note 22, at 454-61.
36. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1414 (West 1954); City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33
Cal. 2d 908, 926, 207 P.2d 17, 29 (1949); City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 186
Cal. 7, 26-28, 198 P. 784, 792-93 (1921). See generally HUTCHINS, supra note 22, at 40, 47,
455-56.
37. See, e.g., Corona Foothill Lemon Co. v. Lillibridge, 8 Cal. 2d 522, 66 P.2d 443
(1937); HUTCHINS, upra note 22, at 457.
38. See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 135, 74 P. 766, 772 (1903). These rules are
modified with respect to groundwater storage rights; an importer of water to a basin has first
call to that amount of water that it adds to the total basin supply. See City of Los Angeles v.
City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).
39. County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (lnyo II), 61 Cal. App. 3d 91, 100, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 167, 173 (1976).
40. 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
41. Although the appropriations invaded the rights of overlying owners and prior appropriators, id at 928-30, 207 P.2d at 30-31, the adverse extractions established prescriptive
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physical solution to the dispute between the parties. 42 This pragmatic
ruling perpetuated existing practices, however, rather than indepen-

dently developing an extraction pattern that would optimize either beneficial use or environmental quality. Moreover, the Pasadena court
43
instead of taking
considered only the concerns of the parties before it,
a broader view and considering the rights of potential parties and non-

proprietary interests.
The Pasadenacourt's adoption of a pragmatic, narrow solution to
the dispute before it was followed in City o/Los Angeles v. City of San
Fernando4 in 1975. The court suggested that in future disputes, formalistic theories of groundwater law should be subordinate to practical
physical solutions. 45 Significantly, therefore, the San Fernando court
rejected the Pasadenacourt's reliance on a theory of prescriptive rights.
In San Fernando, certain extractors competing with Los Angeles asserted a mutually prescriptive restraint on Los Angeles's extractions,
citing Pasadena as authority. Los Angeles, in opposition, argued that
the city should have an absolute first call on any future imports of
Owens Valley water to the San Fernando Basin. The court rejected a
prescriptive restraint on Los Angeles for two reasons: first, the court
interpreted the California Civil Code to preclude prescriptive rights
against Los Angeles; 4 6 second, and more importantly, the court ex47
pressly refused to adopt the physical solution imposed in Pasadena.
That decision, the court explained, had "reach[ed] a fair result on the
facts there presented, '4 8 but could no longer be relied upon as doctrine.49 Thus, the California courts have been admonished to adopt
rights. Id at 930, 207 P.2d at 31. These prescriptive rights were entitled to treatment equal
to actual uses made by overlying extractors in the basin. Id at 932-33, 207 P.2d at 32.
42. The court affirmed the trial court judgment, to which all but one extractor had
stipulated, id at 916, 207 P.2d at 23, thus ratifying the existing division of the basin, id at
922-23, 207 P.2d at 26-27, and enabling an appointed water master to implement a proportionate reduction in extractions to cure the overdraft, id at 923, 207 P.2d at 27. This device
was necessary to avoid application of the correlative rights doctrine, which would have required termination of well-established appropriations from the overdrafted basin.
43. Id at 919-20, 207 P.2d at 25.
44. 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).
45. Id at 265-66 & n.61, 537 P.2d at 1298-99 & n.61, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50 & n.61.
46. Id at 270-77, 537 P.2d at 1301-07, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 51-58. California Civil Code
§ 1007 (West Supp. 1981) precludes prescriptive rights against the property of certain public
entities.
47. 14 Cal. 3d at 267, 537 P.2d at 1299, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
48. Id at 266, 537 P.2d at 1298, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
49. "[The theory of prescriptive rights is not conducive to] the most equitable apportionment of water according to need. A true equitable apportionment would take into account many more factors." Id at 265, 537 P.2d at 1298, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (footnote
omitted).
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physical solutions deriving not from theory but rather from the "broad
equitable powers" 50 of the trial court.
San Fernando brought judicial administration of groundwater
closer to reality by rejecting doctrinal law in favor of a pragmatic solution. A court's simple assessment of "pragmatism;" however, may not
result in wise management of the resource. The court or watermaster
refers only to the proprietary claimants before it; in the San Fernando
decision, which discussed the city's exhaustive Owens Valley extractions, the court considered only the effect of its ruling on Los Angeles
and on the San Fernando extractors. The court's action invited increased extractions from the Owens Basin, without considering or evaluating the effects of the decision on the nonparty Owens Valley or on
the state's water resources as a whole.
The 1928 Amendment to the California Constitution

The reasonable and beneficial use rule enunciated in Katz v.
Walkinshaw51 was accorded constitutional status in the 1928 amendment to the California Constitution. 52 The amendment, which applies
to all water in the state,53 seeks to maximize the productivity of a limited resource by preventing waste.5 4 Professor Well, the amendment's
foremost proponent, noted that a "prior reservoir or other project may
very likely be called upon to share reasonably with later projects or
submit to other reasonable restrictions in order that later development
55
may also succeed."
In early cases, the California Supreme Court cautiously avoided
the full implications of Professor Weil's interpretation of the amendment. In Gin S. Chow v. City of SantaBarbara,5 6 the court held that the
50. Id at 292, 537 P.2d at 1317, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
51. 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903).
52. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
53. The amendment was first applied to groundwater in Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2
Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935).
54. The amendment was drafted and adopted to overrule the 4-to-3 California
Supreme Court decision in Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252 P.
607 (1926). See Joslin v. Matin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 137,429 P.2d 889, 892, 60
Cal. Rptr. 377, 380 (1967). Herminghaus held that a single riparian could insist on maximum flood flows once a year, at the expense of upstream beneficial uses. 200 Cal. at 111-12,
252 P. at 618-19. The amendment's provisions are intended to prevent waste by permitting
as many beneficial uses of water as possible, rather than by permitting proprietary doctrine
to exalt one use to the exclusion of all others.
55. Weil, The Pending Water Amendment to the Calfornia Constitution, and Possible
Legislation, 16 CALiF. L. Rnv. 257, 267 (1928) (emphasis omitted); see also Joslin v. Marin
Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967).
56. 217 Cal. 673, 22 P.2d 5 (1933).
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amendment "is a legitimate exercise of the police power, ' 57 and emphasized that "[t]he present and future well-being and prosperity of the
state depends upon the conservation of its life-giving waters. ' 58 Two
years later, the court gingerly expounded on the amendment's potential, pointing out that "[w]hat is a beneficial use, of course, depends
upon the facts and circumstances of each case. . . What is a beneficial use at one time may, because of changed conditions, become a
' 59
waste of water at a later time.
Recent opinions of the California courts illustrate the efficacy of
the 1928 amendment to restrain established water rights. In Joslin v.
Marin Municipal Water District,60 the California Supreme Court declared that the amendment's operation on existing water uses does not
require an exercise of the eminent domain provisions of the constitution because the amendment reasonably exercises the police power of
the state. 6 1 The court unequivocally stated that the amendment redefines water rights, 62 reasoning that, "since there was and is no property
right in an unreasonable use, there has been no taking or damaging of
property by the deprivation of such use and, accordingly, the deprivation is not compensable. ' 63 Moreover, the court reiterated the rule that
a determination of what constitutes reasonable and beneficial use depends on the circumstances of each case.64 The court's opinion eloquently concluded that "such an inquiry cannot be resolved in vacuo
isolated from statewide considerations of transcendent importance.
Paramount among these we see the ever increasing need for conservation of water in this state, an inescapable reality of life quite apart from
its express recognition in the 1928 amendment. ' 65 In Joslin, therefore,
the California Supreme Court upheld the power of the state to redefine
water rights without compensating those who might take less under
66
subsequent determinations of reasonable and beneficial use.
57.
58.

Id at 701, 22 P.2d at 16.
Id

59. Tulare Irrig. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrig. Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 567, 45 P.2d
972, 1007 (1935); see also Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351,367-68, 40 P.2d 486, 491-

92 (1935).
60.

67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967).

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id
Id
d
Id
Id

at 144, 429 P.2d at
at 144, 429 P.2d at
at 145, 429 P.2d at
at 140, 429 P.2d at
(footnote omitted).

897-98,
897, 60
898, 60
894, 60

60 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
Cal. Rptr. at 384.
Cal. Rptr. at 385.
Cal. Rptr. at 381.

66. Cf Gin S. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 705, 22 P.2d 5, 18 (1933)
(amendment's definition of the riparian right as the right to make reasonable use of water
held to be a permissible exercise of police power). But see United States v. Gerlach Live-

stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 751-53 (1950) (United States Supreme Court interpreted amend-
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The recent decision of In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream
System 6O underscores the amendment's efficacy in redefining water
rights. As part of a streamwide adjudication before the State Water
Resources Control Board (State Board), a riparian landowner who
owned eighty-nine acres currently under irrigation sought to guarantee

his future riparian right to sufficient water to irrigate an additional
2,884 acres. 68 The court upheld the stream adjudication procedure authorized by the legislature, ruling that the amendment "recognized that

the promotion of its salutary policies would require granting the legislature broad flexibility in determining the appropriate means for protecting scarce state water resources.

'6 9

Citing Joslin, the court

validated the power of the State Board to determine the scope, nature,
and priority of surface water rights to promote reasonable and benefi-

cial use.70 If an unexercised riparian right thwarts the reasonable and
beneficial use of a stream by other users, the State Board is authorized
to make determinations regarding the scope, nature, and priority of the
right. 7 1 In contrast, under the traditional theory of riparian rights, the
riparian owner's inchoate right to the future use of water could never
72
be extinguished.

*The underlying thesis of Long Valley-that no property right exists in the unreasonable use of water-applied in that case only to surface water. The mandate of the 1928 amendment, however, does not
distinguish which water rights are subject to the rule of reasonable and

beneficial use;73 nor does it distinguish the authority of the State Board
from that of other public agencies to implement the rule.
As a substitute for piecemeal adjudication, 74 the California Legisment as being a restraint only on riparian's injunctive remedies, suggesting in dictum that
impairment of riparian's historic use, even if unreasonable, would require compensation).
This interpretation of California state law conflicts with that subsequently enunciated in
Joslin v. Main Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967).
67. 25 Cal. 3d 339, 599 P.2d 656, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979).
68. Id at 346, 599 P.2d at 660, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
69. Id at 351-52, 599 P.2d at 663, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
70. 1d at 353-54, 599 P.2d at 664-65, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59.
71. Id at 358-59, 599 P.2d at 668-69, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
72. See, e.g., Miller & Lux v. Madera Canal & Irrig. Co., 155 Cal. 59, 64, 99 P. 502,
511-12 (1909).
73. The amendment has been held to apply expressly to all of the state's waters. See
Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935).
74. In Long Valley, the California Supreme Court noted its dissatisfaction with judicial
determinations of the extent and priorities of water use. "[IT]here is a limitation inherent in
the ability of private law suits to provide clarity, certainty, and security to water rights and
water users." 25 Cal. 3d at 347, 599 P.2d at 661, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 354. Similarly, the court
noted in Meridian, Ltd. v. City & County of San Francisco, 13 Cal. 2d 424,457, 90 P.2d 537,
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lature has created a framework for comprehensive allocation of rights
along streams under the auspices of the State Board, a procedure that
requires the "consideration" of the public interest. 75 Yet the State
Board has not acted and generally cannot act on other than post-1914
surface diversions; 76 although the State Board may take action to prevent unreasonable use of water, 77 its subject matter jurisdiction is limited to the authority granted to it by the legislature. 7 8 The State
Board's actions, most recently manifested in Long Valley, demonstrate
that state-regulated adjudication can consider the "public interest" in
providing a comprehensive reallocation of all uses.
With respect to groundwater, however, the law has been formulated in a series of nonconstitutional contests between holders of proprietary groundwater rights. Even the most sophisticated basin
adjudications have been limited to the interests of the parties before the
court.79 Thus, in groundwater adjudications, the public interest is
neither protected nor expressly considered. Regulation of surface
water by the State Board can result in control superior to that achieved
through piecemeal adjudication of individual rights. Neither the courts
nor the State Board, however, has assessed groundwater management
in terms of the best interests of the entire state as required by the rule of
reasonable and beneficial use. In the Owens Valley, therefore, the duty
to protect the resource ultimately devolved upon Inyo County.
The Owens Valley:
Origin of a Nonproprietary Groundwater Law
The Owens Valley stands as a paradigm of the conflict between
those who advocate unrestrained development and those who seek to
preserve natural resources. The physical and cultural history of the
Owens Valley is closely allied with the meteoric growth and prosperity
of Los Angeles, 250 miles to .the south. While farmers in the rural
Owens Valley enjoyed a stable and bountiful agricultural economy,
Los Angeles so successfully promoted growth that, in the last twenty
years of the nineteenth century, its population increased tenfold. 80 By
553 (1939), that judicial resolution "is necessarily piecemeal, unduly expensive and obviously unsatisfactory."
75. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2501, 2525 (West 1971).
76. See id §§ 179, 1200-1201.
77. See id § 275.
78. See id §§ 179, 186.
79. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d
1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975). See text accompanying notes 44-50 supra.
80. E. COOPER, AQUEDUCT EMPIRE 59 (1968).
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1904, because of growth and reports of subnormal rainfall, the city's
civic leaders sought a new supply of water. They ultimately turned to
the Owens River.
Los Angeles's engineers recognized that by diverting the Owens
River above its natural terminus at Owens Lake, the river could be
caused to flow by gravity across the Mojave Desert and into the Los
Angeles Basin. To implement their plan, city officials began to acquire
property in the Owens Valleys '-acquisitions that under existing water
law were expected to ensure an absolute right to almost the entire water
supply of the valley. By the 1930's, the city had completed its acquisitions and an equilibrium was established with respect to surface water.
The Search for Groundwater
In 1963, Los Angeles destroyed the equilibrium reached after decades of conflict over the surface waters of the Owens Valley by announcing its intention to build a second aqueduct adjacent to the
existing aqueduct. The second aqueduct was designed to double the
amount of water the city could draw out of the Sierra. This increase
could be achieved by a combination of increased groundwater pumping, increased diversions from Mono Lake,8 2 and decreased irrigation
of valley lands leased for local ranching and farming.8 3 The city initially proposed only a moderate program of groundwater extraction to
supplement natural runoff from the Sierra in dry years.8 4 Upon completion of the second aqueduct in June 1970, however, the LADWP
increased both its planned extractions of groundwater and its actual
85
pumping.
81. Id
82. For a description of the impacts created by Los Angeles's Mono Lake diversions
since 1970, and discussion of legal remedies to restrain those diversions, see Comment, The
Public Trust Doctrine Within California Water Law: National.4udubonSociety v. Department
of Water andPower, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 653 (1982).
83. See generally DEP'T OF WATER & POWER, CITY OF Los ANGELES, AVAILABILITY
AND UTILIZATION OF INYO-MONO WATER, VI REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY OF A SECOND
BARREL TO THE Los ANGELES AQUEDUCT (1963).
84. See generally Rossmann, Waterfor the Valley, in DEEPEST VALLEY 202, 203-04 (G.
Smith ed. 1978).
85. See DEP'T OF WATER & POWER, CITY OF Los ANGELES, INCREASED PUMPING OF
THE OWENS VALLEY GROUNDWATER BASIN app. 6, at A6-7 (1978). In 1970, the actual
pumping exceeded 90 cubic feet per second (cfs). Id Two years later, pumping exceeded
139 cfs. Id Subsequently, the LADWP proposed an average extraction rate of 180 cfs, with
a dry year maximum of 376 cfs. DEP'T OF WATER & POWER, CITY OF LOS ANGELES, INCREASED PUMPING IN THE OWENS VALLEY (1974). See generally P. WILLIAMS, CHANGES IN
THE OWENS VALLEY SHALLOW GROUNDWATER LEVELS FROM 1970 TO 1978 (1978). This
pumping dried up the valley's most popular springs and caused the local perception that
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Litigation Under the California Environmental Quality Act
When confronted with similar unilateral actions by Los Angeles in
the past, Owens Valley residents had appealed to the state legislature,
and by forceful actions, such as dynamiting the aqueduct in the 1920's,
had appealed to public sympathy. 86 Under traditional water law, valley residents had no other recourse. Los Angeles's successful land acquisition campaign left both the valley residents and the county
government without a proprietary interest by which to invoke the restraints of proprietary water law; the county was neither a riparian or
overlying owner nor an actual or potential appropriator. Established
case law provided remedies only to actual water users suffering actual
injuries. 87 The county, however, sought not to protect a competing private economic interest, but rather to protect the health, welfare, and
environment of its constituents.
The county launched its first effort to transcend traditional proprietary water law in 1972 under the recently enacted CEQA.8 8 In County
of Inyo v. Yorty (Inyo 1),89 the county claimed that the LADWP's
groundwater pumping project was causing irreparable environmental
harm to the Owens Valley and that the LADWP had failed to prepare
an environmental impact report on that project.90 The county demanded that Los Angeles be enjoined from extracting groundwater
from Owens Valley until the LADWP prepared an environmental impact report, and that the court retain jurisdiction over the county's
claim to prevent any groundwater pumping that would cause environmental damage in the valley. 9 1
Upon filing its action, the county sought a preliminary injunction
that would remain in effect until the trial was completed. The trial
judge denied the injunction, concluding that Los Angeles's principal
defense had merit; 92 an environmental impact report was not required
for either the second aqueduct or any pumping subsequently initated to
depleted valley vegetation failed to protect against airborne dust resulting from the valley's
intense winds. See Rossmann, Waterfor the Valley, in DEEPEST VALLEY 202, 203 (G. Smith
ed. 1978); see also CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, BULL. No. 118-80, GROUNDWATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA 51 (1980).
86. See V. OSTRUM, WATER & POLITICS 124 (1953).
87. See Hillside Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 677, 76 P.2d 671 (1938).
88. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
89. 32 Cal. App. 2d 795, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973).
90. CEQA requires all public agencies to prepare environmental impact reports on
their projects that "may have a significant effect on the environment." CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§§ 21108, 21151 (West 1977).
91. 32 Cal. App. 3d at 798, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
92. Id.
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fill it, because the aqueduct was completed and placed in operation five
months prior to the effective date of CEQA. The county appealed this
denial of the preliminary injunction. The court of appeal elected to
treat the county's request for an injunction as a claim for final relief on
the merits, assuming the duty of adjudicating that claim within its original jurisdiction.
In .Inyo ., the court relied upon the express legislative intent that
the government "'take all action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and
enhance the environmental quality of the state,' and to '[e]nsure that
the long-term protection of the environment shall be the guiding criterion in public decisions.' -93 The court concluded that the continuing
plan of extraction must independently satisfy the requirements of
CEQA. "[T]he legislative intent so strongly expressed in CEQA can be
met only by considering the expanded groundwater extraction as a
'project' separate and divisible from the second aqueduct. . .. -94 The
court reasoned that the impact of increased pumping was not fixed by
the design of the second aqueduct. Instead, the impact of increased
pumping depended on the vagaries of the weather to provide water and
the discretion of engineers to extract it. The actual extractions, occurring after CEQA's effective date, were held to be subject to the environmental analysis required by the Act, 95 and the court issued a writ of
mandate directing Los Angeles to prepare an environmental impact report for the project. In an effort to afford immediate relief to the
county, the appellate court established guidelines for the maximum allowable extractions pending the LADWP's compliance with CEQA's
environmental reporting requirements, and imposed a temporary extraction rate of eighty-nine cubic feet per second (cfs). 96 The superior
97
court ultimately set the interim extraction rate at 178.5 cfs.
Although the definition of the project supplied by the appellate
court seemed clear, the city limited its environmental report to what
Inyo County claimed was a deliberately truncated version of the pro93. 32 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (quoting CAL. PUB. REs. CODE
§ 21001(a), (b) (West 1977)).
94. Id at 806, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
95. Id
96. Id at 815, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 391. The court of appeal required the superior court to
determine "that figure which is found to be the mean or average of the extraction during the
years of highest and lowest precipitation .... ." d Thus the interim extraction rate was
not based on the hydrology of the Owens Valley, but solely on the average of the LADWP's
"needs" as defined by that agency.
97. See Inyo II, 61 Cal. App. 3d 91, 92, 132 Cal. Rptr. 167, 169 (1976).
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ject. 98 According to the LADWP, because the second aqueduct was
excluded from CEQA, so was the pumping of the water that would fill
it; only pumping that produced water for in-valley uses formed the subject of its environmental impact report. The county asserted that the
LADWP's narrow definition of the project made it erroneously appear
beneficial to Inyo County. The city thereby avoided any public inquiry
into or assessment of feasible alternatives to its appropriation, such as
conservation in Los Angeles. Despite these protests by Inyo County,
the LADWP certified its "limited project" environmental impact report
and approved the expanded groundwater project on July 15, 1976. 99
This action, taken at the onset of the most serious drought in the
state's history,10 0 provided the impetus for the county's next legal challenge to the Los Angeles extraction program. In County of Znyo v. City
of Los Angeles (Inyo II),11 the county challenged both the interim extraction rate and the sufficiency of the LADWP's environmental impact
report. The appellate court agreed with the county's contentions that
the superior court had established too high a rate. The court, however,
rejected the county's argument that the LADWP's extractions should
be limited to the rate that prevailed at the date of CEQA's enactment.
Noting the drought conditions then present, the court fixed the rate at
10 2
149.56 cfs.
In setting this interim rate, the court observed that the "water
which forms the subject of this law suit is one component of an integrated array of water resources .... ,,103 As Los Angeles exercised
virtually complete control over all water resources in the Owens Valley,
the court recognized that judicial limitation of groundwater extractions
could be frustrated by increased diversion and export of surface water.
The court also described the potentially adverse effect on the groundwater supply that offsetting increased surface diversions would produce: "Locally used water replenishes underground aquifers; exported
98. See County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (Inyo III), 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 197, 139
Cal. Rptr. 396, 404 (1977).
99. See DEP'T OF WATER & POWER, CITY OF Los ANGELES, INCREASED PUMPING OF
THE OWENS VALLEY GROUNDWATER BASIN (1976).
100. See GOVERNOR'S DROUGHT EMERGENCY TASK FORCE, ALTERNATIVE DROUGHT

STRATEGIES FOR 1978 (1978).
101. 61 Cal. App. 3d 91, 132 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1976).
102. Id at 96-98, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 170-72. The court concluded that the rate should
have been determined on a water-runoff year (April-March) basis, rather than the fiscal year

(July-June) basis used by the superior court. The artificial fiscal year calculation urged by
the LADWP would have yielded a higher extraction rate based on the term during which
the rate was to be measured. Id
103. Id at 100, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 173.

March 19821

GROUNDWATER

water does not."' 4 These facts led the court to conclude that "[l]imited
control over surface water exports is a necessary auxiliary to an effec05
tive groundwater pumping limitation."'
In addition to challenging the interim extraction rate in Inyo II,

the county challenged the sufficiency of the environmental impact report submitted by the LADWP and urged the court not to discharge the
writ until a sufficient report was prepared. The court of appeal accepted this claim in Inyo II and one year later adjudicated the sufficiency of the report in County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (Inyo

Il).106

104. Id
105. Id
106. 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 139 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1977). Earlier in 1977, the court of appeal
adjudicated a more immediate dispute over the extraction rate. Restricted in 1976 to a
149.56 cfs rate during the relatively dry water year then in progress, the city turned to its
Colorado River and California aqueduct sources of supply. When 1977 brought even more
serious drought conditions, LADWP moved the court to allow pumping at a maximum rate
of 315 cfs. Noting that the drought had produced even greater distress in Inyo County than
Los Angeles, the county urged the court to reject the LADWP's claim in light of Los Angeles's failure to adopt a single water conservation ordinance.
In a preliminary memorandum, County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 3 Civ. 13886
(Cal. Ct. App. March 24, 1977) (unpublished preliminary memorandum) (on file with the
HastingsLaw Journal), the court replied that until Los Angeles conserved water its request
to extract additional Owens Valley groundwater was not likely to be granted. The court
stated that Los Angeles's failure to adopt an effective water conservation program, standing
alone, would compel denial of the LADWP's motion to increase the pumping rate. "In
relation to the state's current water crisis, the effort at voluntary conservation is inadequate
to justify the requested relief. The California Constitution abjures waste of water and seeks
its conservation in the interest of the state's entire population. When the state's water resources dwindle, the constitutional demands grow more stringent and compelling, to the end
that scarcity and personal sacrifice be shared as widely as possible among the state's inhabitants." Id at 3.
Moreover, the court rejected Los Angeles's contention that it should increase its Owens
Valley extractions to save the higher purchase price of Colorado River water. "Unless and
until the municipal government of Los Angeles installs and implements methods which are
predictably capable of achieving substantial water savings and demonstrates a need for
water rather than rate preservation, its motion for leave to extract additional groundwater
from Owens Valley is not likely to meet with success." Id at 4.
In response to this memorandum, Los Angeles enacted the first water conservation
measure in its history. Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance No. 149,700 (May 12, 1977); see Nadeau, Los Angeles:4 City That Water Built, Los Angeles Times, June 26, 1977, pt. VII, at I,
col. I. Having achieved 19% conservation, the LADWP, in July 1977, renewed its request
for a 315 cfs maximum extraction rate. The city's motion, supported by the Metropolitan
Water District (MWD), argued that because all water supplies and all groundwater basins in
the state were being drawn down to their limits, the Owens Valley groundwater basin should
not be excepted. Although the county objected, arguing that the city's and MWD's conservation did not match that of northern California urban centers, and that the 149.56 cfs rate
be maintained to provide LADWP an incentive to complete an adequate environmental
impact report, nonetheless, on July 22, 1977, the court ordered that the extraction rate be
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In Inyo III, the court of appeal traced the tortuous history of the
LADWP's environmental impact report preparation and found the report legally insufficient. The court found the report's narrowly drawn
project description, which did not include groundwater exports, to be
an "egregious misrepresentation" of the mandate of the court's Inyo I
decision. 0 7 The court pointed to the consequences of this insufficient
environmental impact report: not only had Los Angeles evaded an assessment of the project's impact on Inyo County, but it had also concealed from the citizens of Inyo County and Los Angeles the true
nature of the groundwater pumping proposal and its impact on the
people and environment of both communities. 8 Specifically, the
LADWP's exclusion of groundwater for export not only concealed alternatives to such export, but also concealed the growth-inducing impact that such a net increase in export would produce in southern
California.
The court also agreed with the county that LADWP had failed to
consider the constitutionally mandated alternative of water conservation in Los Angeles.
The underlying policy and express provisions of CEQA limit the approving agency's power to authorize an environmentally harmful
proposal when an economically feasible alternative is available. Notably, the Los Angeles environmental impact report omits another
alternative, one freighted with costs other than dollars. The omitted
alternative is a tangible, foreseeably effective plan for achieving distinctly articulated water conservation goals within the Los Angeles
service area. It is doubtful whether an environmental impact report
can fulfill CEQA's demands without proposing so obvious an
doubled to 315 cfs, provided that the LADWP maintain its conservation record and extract
only from deep wells. County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 3 Civ. 13886 (Cal. Ct. App.
July 22, 1977) (unpublished order) (on file with the HastingsLaw Journal).
107. 71 Cal. App. 3d at 193, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 402. The court noted that by a "process of
verbal transmutation," the environmental impact report used the pumping rates in effect at
CEQA's effective date as a baseline from which to describe the project, rather than the actual preproject levels of extraction. Id at 195, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 403..
Stating that "an accurate, stable and finite project description is the sine qua non of an
informative and legally sufficient EIR," id. at 199, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 406, the court held that
Los Angeles had failed to comply with the writ of mandate issued as a result of the 1973
decision. This failure was evidenced not only by the "calculated selection of [a] truncated
project concept," Id at 200, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 406, but by the city's failure to consider all
reasonable alternatives to the project. The court characterized the purported "no project"
alternative as a "synthetically conceived election between the synthetically conceived project
and destruction of the Owens Valley cattle industry." Id at 202, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 407. In
sum, the court rejected the treatment of various alternatives as the embodiment of "a distinct
refusal to view the [export] increase as a 'project.'" Id, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
108. See id at 198, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
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alternative.'0 9
Recognizing that the groundwater extraction formed but one element
of the LADWP's integrated water-gathering activities, the court also
suggested that the city prepare a comprehensive environmental impact
report embracing all of its water production programs. Such planning
would enable the city each year to select from its many sources the
conservation and extraction pattern that would minimize harm to the
environment. 110
In 1979, the LADWP again certified an environmental impact report on increased pumping in the Owens Valley. This time the
LADWP included within its project all groundwater extraction, but excluded from the project the changes in surface diversions that the
LADWP claimed would accompany the increased groundwater extraction. In County of Znyo v. City ofLos Angeles (InyoIF),III the court of
appeal, called upon to evaluate the second return of the writ of mandate issued in Inyo 1, again rejected the report because of its "synthetic""12 and "sham 113 project description. Specifically, the city had
asserted that the court should not consider the relatively great availability of pre-1970 surface supplies and the fact that promises of "increased" water supplies could not be squared with either the actual
availability of surface supplies or the LADWP's underlying design.
Noting that the LADWP's no-project alternative was predicated upon
surface conditions different from those that preceded the project, the
court stated that the environmental impact report "critically distorts the
relation of the project to the export of water to the City of Los Angeles.""14 Although the report presented the groundwater project as one
that would make water available for agriculture, recreation, wildlife,
and other uses on city lands within Inyo County, the court emphasized
that, "asaphysicalmatter,virtually all of the additional pumped water
will flow into the aqueducts and to Los Angeles." ' ls
The Znyo IV court acknowledged that the 1979 environmental impact report embraced all groundwater operations, but condemned the
city's decision to exclude surface water, which as a physical matter
109. Id at 203, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
110. 71 Cal. App. 3d at 204, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
111. 124 Cal. App. 3d 1, 177 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1981). After its decision in lnyo 11f, the
court rejected the county's claim for attorney's fees. County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles,
78 Cal. App. 3d 82, 144 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1978).
112. Id at 11, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
113. Id
114. Id at 10-11, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
115. Id at 7, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 482. (Emphasis in original).
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would have to provide the in-valley irrigation supply that the LADWP
represented as a mitigating component of the groundwater extraction
program. In determining the scope of its inquiry, the court relied on
the LADWP's own formulation of the project:
An [environmental impact report] may not define a purpose for a
project and then remove from consideration those matters necessary
to assessment whether the purpose can be achieved. Since the [final
environmental impact report] removed the availability of surface
water from examination it failed the legal duty and the mandate of
this Court to provide1 6 an informed and accurate analysis of the project and its impact.'
The report's no-project alternative, based upon conditions other
than those that preceded the project, also formed a ground for rejecting
the report. The court recognized that the report "made it appear that
the project was necessary to avoid something worse, 'the destruction of
the Owens Valley cattle industry,' a condition which did not precede
the project." '" 7 Condemning the city's use of such artificial conditions,
the court stated: "It can readily be seen that any project can be made to
look good by posing a 'synthetic' 'no-project' alternative consisting of
the absence of the project plus some additional condition which is
much worse than the project."1 1 8 The court characterized this defect as
"the exact deficiency upon which we rejected the first [environmental
impact report]." 'l 9
Having found the 1979 environmental impact report deficient, the
court of appeal disposed of the case in a concluding paragraph that
reiterated precisely the final sentences of the 1977 opinion. Specifically,
the court maintained its writ in full effect, directed Los Angeles "to take
reasonable expeditious actions to comply with it" and continued the
existing extraction rate.120
The dissenting opinion argued, "[T]he conclusion reached by the
majority effectively grants, sub silentio, the request of the county to
expand the scope of the writ and requires analysis and discussion in the
[report] of the interrelationship between the extraction or takedown of
the subsurface water and the continuing export of surface water in
aqueduct No. 1.' 121 The dissent's observation is correct, but only because of the inherently interrelated surface water and groundwater op116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at 9, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
at 12, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
at 13, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
at 14-15, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
at 18, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 489 (Evans, J., dissenting).
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erations that the LADWP chose to make a part of its groundwater
project. Thus, had the LADWP elected to define a project that consisted only of increased groundwater extractions, with no change in
surface supplies providing a putative increased benefit to the Owens
Valley lands, presumably the majority opinion would not have struck
down the report for excluding surface diversion. A careful reading of
the majority decision--especially in its analysis of preproject conditions-suggests, however, that the Inyo IV court continued a theme developed in both Inyo I and Inyo Ill-that the project requiring CEQA
analysis is not defined as one of groundwater extraction, but rather as a
project consisting of all new water-gathering practices proposed or
made possible by completion of the second aqueduct.
In its 1973 interpretation of CEQA, the Inyo I court held the Act
applicable to an annually approved project, which had been initiated
prior to CEQA's enactment but in subsequent years had remained subject to continuing discretion that could either produce or prevent environmental damage. As a functional rule of resource management, the
court's determination in Inyo I cannot be questioned; if any decisionmaking body meets its annual needs by selecting from a variety of annually variable resources, then the body should perform a comparative
environmental assessment of the effects of each of the alternative resource mixes available to the decisionmakers. That a particular alternative might appear to be the least expensive should not preclude an
analysis of its environmental impact or of the impact of extracting or
conserving alternative supplies; only by such a comparative environmental analysis can the decisionmaker assess the true costs-present
and future, economic, environmental, social, and political--of the project it ultimately approves.1 22
The court's 1977 opinion in Inyo III also gave life to CEQA's substantive policy that environmental damage should be prevented, if possible, by the conservation of resources. Not only must conservation be
23
examined as the alternative preferred by the California Constitution, 1
but also the substantive provisions of CEQA, as interpreted by the leg122. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1975), af'dinpart and rev'd
inpart on othergroundssub non Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd
on othergroundssub nom California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981), however, a federal
district court distinguished Inyo - and refused to require an environmental impact report on
the variable and increasing extraction rate at the California Water Project's Delta Pumping
Plant. The court erroneously ruled that any extraction within the existing design capacity
was exempt from environmental analysis. 400 F. Supp. at 650.
123. See CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
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islature and the courts, 24 require conservation if it would be economically feasible and effective.
In procedure as well as in substance, the court of appeal advanced
the judicial administration of water resources. Both its 1976 order in
Inyo I, providing that the groundwater extraction limit would not be
frustrated by increased surface diversions, and its 1977 dictum in Inyo
III, urging the city to prepare an environmental impact report on its
integrated extraction program, cast aside prior legal distinctions between surface and groundwater. In setting the extraction rates, moreover, the court not only invoked public considerations in Inyo County,
but also looked beyond the parties' dispute to rule in the context of the
state's total resources and demands. By use of its injunctive power, the
court demonstrated that the county, although not holding any water
rights of its own, could nonetheless effectuate restraints on Los Angeles's proprietary water rights. 125
Limitations of jurisdiction and competence, however, did emerge
in these cases. First, the county recognized that at some point the
LADWP might prepare an environmental impact report that would
pass judicial muster, thereby eliminating at least one claim that gave
the court its jurisdiction over the LADWP's groundwater extractions.
Second, even if the county pressed its substantive claims under CEQA,
recent decisions in other appellate courts revealed a judicial reluctance
to scrutinize the factual foundations of findings that the LADWP could
render in evasion of CEQA's substantive mandate to prevent environmental harm. 12 6 Even when its jurisdiction was secure, the court could
not act with the dispatch and precision necessary to prevent further
decline in the groundwater table. Although the court responded immediately to Inyo County's plea that irrigation water to the valley's
124.

CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21002, 21002.1, 21081 (West 1977) (codifying the Califor-

nia Supreme Court's dictum that "obviously," environmental damage should be avoided
when possible); see Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 747, 263 n.8, 502
P.2d 1049, 1059 n.8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 771 n.8 (1972).
125. County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (Inyo III), 71 Cal. App. 3d at 203, 139 Cal.

Rptr. at 408.
126. See, e.g., Foundation for San Francisco's Architectural Heritage v. City & County
of San Francisco (City of Paris), 106 Cal. App. 3d 893, 165 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1980) (nationally

significant landmark demolished notwithstanding planning director's testimony that building could be reused); Laurel Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. City Council, 83 Cal. App. 3d 515,

147 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1978) (conventional subdivision approved although profitable cluster
development at lower density would produce far less environmental damage). These decisions have been criticized. See Note, CEQA's Substantive Mandate Clouded by Appellate
Court, 8 ENVTL L. REP. 10,208, 10,210-11 (1978); Comment, SubstantiveEnforcement ofthe
California Environmental Quality Act, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 112, 124-31 (1981).
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ranches be maintained during the 1976-77 drought, 12 7 the court did not
respond immediately with respect to the general extraction limitations
in the Owens Valley. After three years of referrals to the superior
court, during which the LADWP took as much groundwater as it
wanted, the Inyo II court finally established an annual extraction rate
according to a formula based on extraction patterns for 1970-73;128 the
court did not key its extraction rate to any data on the shallow groundwater level or to the aquifer's differing characteristics throughout the
valley. 129
Moreover, the court has been especially wary of expressly recog-

nizing Inyo County's substantive claim of unreasonable water extraction, the cause of action based on the 1928 constitutional
amendment.130 The court's ultimate entertainment of that constitu-

tional claim would not necessarily provide effective relief; Inyo County
would then be required to prove the specific facts of Los Angeles's

practices and alternative supplies-a requirement entailing exhaustive
discovery and presentation of data. Similarly, the court has not ac-

knowledged the county's claim that, as an area of origin, it enjoys protection against the export of that amount of water necessary to its own
environment and economy.' 31 As with the constitutional claim, however, the county would bear a heavy burden in proving its own needs to
the court. In contrast, direct administrative regulation would eliminate

Inyo County's burden of resorting to the courts for a fair allocation of
its water resources, and instead would place upon the LADWP, both as
applicant before the regulator and as challenger in a petition for judicial review, the burden of providing evidence and convincing a deci-

sionmaker to accept the applicant's interpretation of that evidence.
127. County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 3 Civ. 13886 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1977)
(unpublished order) (on file with the HastingsLaw Journal).
128. See note 102 & accompanying text supra.
129. Neither the court nor Inyo County held any data prior to 1978; when the county
finally produced hydrologic data that would have enabled the court to establish an interim
pumping rate based on hydrology and not on the LADWP's perception of need, the court
simply declined to pass on the county's prayer that the interim rate be considered at the
same time as the LADWP's return of the writ. See Letter from the Clerk of the Court of
Appeal for the Third Appellate District (September 13, 1979) (on file with the HastingsLaw
Journal).
130. See notes 51-79 & accompanying text supra.
131. The "area of origin" doctrine is derived from statutes designed to ensure that areas
from which water is exported are guaranteed sufficient water for local use. See, e.g., CAL.
WATER CODE §§ 10505, 11460, 11463 (West 1971); see also 25 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 8, 9-10
(1955). Although the statutes that embody the doctrine apply only to certain specific water
projects or locations in the state, Inyo County has argued that the principles of the "area of
origin" doctrine apply equally to all areas of origin within the state.
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Proposed Groundwater Regulation by the State
The call for comprehensive groundwater regulation in California
has been heard since the beginning of this century; 132 the 1976-77
drought proved that reform had become long overdue. 133 Although
California has a well-established and relatively comprehensive scheme
relating to surface water, 134 the state's lawmakers have deliberately
avoided groundwater legislation, consequently placing the burden of
groundwater dispute resolution on the courts. The inadequacy of the
resulting piecemeal approach to groundwater management 3 5 became
evident not only in Inyo County, but throughout the state during its
heavy reliance on groundwater in the 1976-77 drought.
Noting that the continuing drought emphasized the need to review
all aspects of water resource management, in May 1977, Governor Edmund Brown, Jr. created the Commission to Review California Water
Rights Law. 13 6 The governor recognized that current water law obfuscates the constitutional mandate that the state's waters be conserved
and put only to reasonable and beneficial uses, and directed the Commission to "evaluate proposals for modifications in this law and . . .
recommend appropriate legislation."1 37 Following publication of study
papers and a draft report, and a series of public hearings and workshops designed to elicit public comment, the Commission in late 1978
138
produced its final report.
The Commission stated that California's extensive groundwater
resources remain unprotected by state regulation,139 despite the legislature's repeated efforts to set the policy foundations for management of
the state's water resources. The Commission further stated that any
protection given to existing private rights to water must "be balanced
132. See, e.g., E. MEAD, REPORT OF IRRIGATION INVESTIGATIONS IN CALIFORNIA 34-35
(1901): "These uncertain but sweeping assertions of speculative ownership of water and the
hostility of water users to the recognition of the control this implies have given rise to antagonisms which must in some way be removed. . . .Neither speculative ownership nor
unrestricted power over rates can continue without injury to the public and both should give
way to institutions of justice. The time has long passed when makeshift laws and temporary
expedients should be resorted to in dealing with this subject."
133. See CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, BULL. No. 118-80, GROUNDWATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA (1980).
134. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200-1801 (West 1971 & Supp. 1981).
135.
136.

See text accompanying note 79 supra.
Cal. Exec. Order No. B-26-77 (May 11, 1977).

137. Id
138. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA
PORT (1978) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
139.

Id

at 145.

WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL RE-
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against the need for adequate preservation of the total water resource
in the interest of all Californians."1 40 With this policy in mind, the
Commission recommended a program for state-supervised management of groundwater.
The Commission believed that local management, under state supervision and subject to state-imposed standards, offered the best opportunity for workable and effective control. Local entities in an area
with demonstrated groundwater problems would be given the opportu41 If
nity to identify or establish a groundwater management authority.
local entities failed to cooperate or existing groundwater regulations
were inadequate, then the State Water Resources Control Board would
designate a groundwater management authority. 142 The proposed legislation would empower management authorities, whether locally constituted or state designated, to develop and implement management
programs, which would43 include registration and licensing of all
groundwater extraction.1
Inyo County viewed this proposal with promise. A joint body consisting of Inyo County, the LADWP, and other Owens Valley public
agencies, so long as no one entity could alone exert control, would be
empowered and compelled to reach balanced decisions.' 44 This forum
would broaden the base of regulation beyond the single-purpose function of the LADWP. At the same time, such an authority's decisions
would prove difficult for any single member to challenge because these
decisions would be based on a broad base of participation in the decisionmaking process.
In describing groundwater problems that would trigger regulation
by the local authority, however, the Commission initially did not include within its examples the impact of groundwater extraction on surface vegetation in a desert environment. 145 Such an omission from the
140. Id at 13.
141. Id at 183-88.
142. Id at 185.
143. Such management powers would include the power to operate necessary waterworks, id at 206, to provide for conjunctive use of surface and groundwater, id at 208, to
register and impose restraints on all existing and future extractions, id. at 209, and to provide
generally for the protection of the environment, id at 215.
144. Other agencies that might participate in a cooperative groundwater management
authority include the City of Bishop, the State Department of Fish and Game, the United
States Bureau of Land Management, and the United States Forest Service. See Comments
of the County of Inyo on the Draft Report of August 1978 of the Governor's Commission to
Review California Water Rights Law 20-21 (Sept. 28, 1978) (on file with the HastingsLaw
Journal)[hereinafter cited as Inyo Comments].
145. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 138, at 140-41.
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operative section of the proposal could have been construed as rendering the recommended legislation inapplicable to the Owens Valley even
though the report's policy section declared one of the state's major
goals in managing groundwater resources to be "to avoid conditions of
146
. . . significant environmental degradation."
In addition to suffering from this ambiguity, the report explicitly
eschewed further development of the "area of origin" doctrine.14 7 In
its comment on the report draft, the county noted that the doctrine was
especially applicable to the Owens Valley region, in which complete
transformation at the hands of distant water interests should give rise to
the "area of origin" protections. 148
The final report, sent to the governor in December 1978, incorporated several important revisions suggested by Inyo County. The"final
report recognized that current groundwater problems might result from
causes more complex than traditional basin overdraft. The proposed
powers of local groundwater management authorities would enable
them to address such complex problems; groundwater districts would
have been authorized to "[l]imit extraction to respond to conditions of
long-term overdraft, subsidence, water quality and other significant environmental degradation, well interference, or the threat of any of the
above .
149 These changes afforded Inyo County an opportunity
to manage the water resources of the valley by including the Owens
Valley groundwater basin in the state's comprehensive groundwater
"...

plan. 150
Legislation to implement the Commission's recommendations was
introduced in both the Senate and Assembly.1 51 Although these bills
146. Id at 171.
147. Id at 3. See note 131 supra.
148. See Inyo Comments, supra note 144, at 20-21; see also R. JOHNSON, MAJOR INTERBASIN TRANSFERS: LEGAL ASPEC-rS 74-76 (Nat'l Water Comm'n Legal Study No. 7,
1971). In County of Inyo v. Public Util. Comm'n, 26 Cal. 3d 154, 157, 604 P.2d 566, 567, 161
Cal. Rptr. 172, 173 (1980), the court noted that Los Angeles made decisions resulting in the

transformation of Inyo County from a "rich agricultural region to one dependent on
tourism."
149. FINAL REPORT, supra note 138, at 209.
150. Inyo County endorsed the Commission's proposals. See Inyo Comments, supra
note 144, at 4-5; Inyo County Takes Fight Over Water to State, Los Angeles Daily J., Sept.
28, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
151. In 1979, the Legislature considered the statutory approach advocated by the Com-

mission in two reform bills: Senate Bill 47 and Assembly Bill 442. With substantially the
same language, each bill provided for legislative designation of areas in need of a comprehensive groundwater management program and for local control over such programs. Periodic review by the State Water Resources Control Board would assure uniformity on a

policy level.
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died in committee,1 52 the legislature did enact Water Code section
12924, which directed the Department of Water Resources to identify
the groundwater basins of the state, including those subject to critical
conditions of overdraft. 153 In its report to the legislature, the department redefined critical overdraft to exclude basins subject to conditions
that threaten to cause adverse environmental, social, or economic im-

pacts. 54 The department instead adopted a narrower definition by
raising the threshold to include only practices that "would probably"
result in adverse impacts. 155 For Inyo County, this compromise was
offset by the department's express recognition of the Owens Valley as a
"basin with special problems." 156 Thus, through Water Code section
12924, the state expressly recognized that Inyo County's unique distress
has not been addressed sufficiently by existing legislation.
Although the legislation recommended by the Commission was
not adopted, the work of the Commission yielded two important conclusions: (1) even a so-called vested groundwater right can be redefined by a police power licensing and permitting program, and (2) the
California Legislature has not yet exercised that power to the exclusion
of regulation by local authorities.157

The Inyo County Ordinance
Faced with the legislature's refusal to respond to the general needs
of the state or the particular needs of the county, Inyo County relied on
152. S.B. 47 failed Jan. 31, 1980. See SENATE FINAL HISTORY, 1979-80 Reg. Sess. 41
(1980). A.B. 442 failed Jan. 30, 1980. See ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY, 1979-80 Reg. Sess.
334 (1980). The groundwater provisions again emerged in mid-1980 in Senate Bill 1361,
which failed Aug. 25, 1980. See SENATE FINAL HISTORY, 1979-80 Reg. Sess. 787 (1980).
The Los Angeles Times reported that passage of the bills was prevented by those "who are
against any semblance of state supervision on the use of underground water supplies .... "
Los Angeles Times, Aug. 26, 1980, pt. 1, at 3, 21, col. 2; see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PUB. No. CED-80-96, GROUNDWATER OVERDRAFTING MUST BE CONTROLLED 13
(1980).
153. See Act of Sept. 7, 1978, ch. 601, 1978 Cal. Stat. 2037 (codified at CAL. WATER
CODE § 12924 (West Supp. 1981)).
154. See CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF WATER RESOUCES, BULL. No. 118-80, GROUNDWATER
BASINS IN CALIFORNIA 9-16 (1980).
155. Id at 11.
156. Id at 51. The report does not define the "special problem" designation but merely
notes that special attention is warranted because of local concern. Id.
157. An initiative measure, the Water Resources Conservation and Efficiency Act of
1982, would establish state-supervised groundwater management in the 11 critically overdrafted basins designated in CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, BULL. No. 118-80,
GROUNDWATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA (1980). Proposed CAL. WATER CODE § 15320.
This measure would not affect local groundwater management in other basins. Proposed
CAL. WATER CODE § 15360.
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its own county government to regulate Los Angeles's exercise of its proprietary groundwater rights. The work of the Governor's Commission
provided a framework within which many of the county's concerns
could be addressed. Locally controlled groundwater management
could forestall environmental harm to vegetation, wildlife, and
humans, while ensuring the continued availability of water for local
and export uses and protecting the groundwater supply from long-term
degradation.
To this end, the Inyo County Board of Supervisors in 1978 directed its counsel to evaluate the legality of an ordinance to regulate
the extraction of groundwater within the Owens Valley groundwater
basin. After Los Angeles's rejection of a plan for cooperative management of the Owens Basin,15 8 the board of supervisors developed a proposed ordinance and placed it before the voters in a referendum. It was
overwhelmingly approved on November 4, 1980.159
Noting that conservation is essential to optimize present and future reasonable and beneficial use, the ordinance 60 declares that
Owens Valley groundwater forms a significant resource of the state that
6
must be managed in trust for the benefit of the state's residents.' ' Citing a lack of such management in the past and the consequent environmental and economic detriment, the ordinance establishes a
comprehensive system of water management to implement certain enumerated goals.
The protection of Inyo County's citizens, environment, and econ162
omy forms the paramount standard for groundwater extraction.
158.

See L.A. County Bidjor Water Truce Fails: City Turns Down Proposal-Court Fight

Looms Again, Los Angeles Times, July 20, 1979, pt. II, at 1, col. 5.
159. The vote was 76% in favor and 24% against the referendum. Inyo County Clerk
Certificate of Election (Nov. 15, 1980); see Inyo County Votes to Control Water Use, Los

Angeles Times, Nov. 6, 1980, pt. II, at 1, col. 1. Although a rarely invoked procedure, the
voluntary referendum enables a governing body to propose legislation but leave its fate in
the hands of the electorate. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3750 (West 1977). In the case described
here, the supervisors recognized that the initial expense of the groundwater ordinance would

tax the county's limited resources, and accordingly sought the voters' express approval of
this fiscal commitment. See Inyo Supervisors Minutes, July 22, 1980.
Los Angeles unsuccessfully attempted to prevent the election, claiming that the county
violated both the CEQA and CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3750 (West 1977) in setting forth the ordinance for a validating referendum. See City of Los Angeles v. County of Inyo, 4 Civ. 25014
(Sept. 25, 1981).
160. An Ordinance to Regulate the Extraction of Groundwater within the Owens Valley
Groundwater Basin, INYO COUNTY, CAL., CODE ch. 7.01 (1980). The ordinance is set forth
as an Appendix to this Article.
161. INYO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 7.01.010(b) (1980); see also CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2;
CAL. WATER CODE § 104 (West 1971).
162. See INYO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 7.01.010(d) (1980).
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Correction or mitigation of significant environmental damage may be
achieved by, among other things, maintaining the groundwater table at
a depth that will support natural vegetation and wildlife, and that will
minimize air pollution caused by increased wind erosion.1 63 The ordinance also seeks to satisfy the needs of extractors by considering both
their alternative sources of supply, including related surface supplies,
and their conservation policies and practices.164 In effectuating these
purposes, the ordinance recognizes that consideration must be given to
the needs of all water users in the state and to the status of the state's
65
total water resources.1
The ordinance creates a county water department and commission166 and directs the department to prepare and the commission to
approve a water management plan. The plan must identify all the
water resources of the valley and develop a water use program consistent with the health and welfare of the county's citizens. 167 To the extent feasible, the plan must be consistent with the county's land use
plans and the needs of parties holding water rights. 168 The plan, which
will form the basis for approval, denial, or conditional grant of each
groundwater permit, would become effective upon adoption by the
69
board of supervisors.1
To extract groundwater lawfully, each extractor must first register
each of its wells.' 70 An application to extract must be submitted annually, stating the location, the planned monthly extraction rate, and the
depth of each well proposed.' 7 1 Potential extractors must describe the
beneficial use to which they intend to place extracted groundwater. 172
The application further requires a description of adverse environmental effects of the proposed extraction and proposed feasible means of
mitigating such effects, including a use or change in use of related sur163. Id § 7.01.030(c).
164. Id § 7.01.030(g).
165. Id § 7.01.030G). This provision comports with article X, § 2 of the California Constitution, and with pronouncements of the court in the CEQA litigation between the county
and the LADWP. See, e.g., County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 3 Civ. 13886, at 30 (Cal.
Ct. App. Mar. 24, 1977) (unpublished preliminary memorandum) (on file with the Hastings
Law Journal): "[Siearcity and personal sacrifice [must] be shared as widely as possible
among the state's inhabitants"; see also note 106 supra.
166. See INYo COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 7.01.020(a) (1980).
167. Id § 7.01.030.
168. Id
169. Id § 7.01.031.
170. Id § 7.01.041(a). The ordinance's registration requirements are the same as those
required pursuant to the Water Code. CAL. WATER CODE § 13750 (West 1971).
171. INYO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 7.01.041(b) (1980).
172. Id § 7.01.041(f).
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face waters. 173
The ordinance establishes a comprehensive procedure for review
of pending applications, by both the director of the county water department and other county, state, and federal authorities whose interests might be affected. 174 After review of each application and
consideration of comments by other authorities, the director must submit to the county water commission a recommendation for approval,
denial, or conditional grant of the permit. The director may also recommend that insignificant applications be placed on a consent calen175
dar, thus avoiding the need for public hearings.
The water commission serves with powers and duties analogous to
those of a planning commission. Composed of citizens appointed at
large by the board of supervisors, the commission must review the director's recommendations, conduct public hearings, and issue a deci176
sion granting, denying, or conditionally granting each application.
The commission's determination may be appealed to the board of supervisors by the applicant or by any person adversely affected.177
Following the issuance of a final decision on each permit application, the water department must issue a permit in conformity with the
results of the review process. Each permit issued is effective for up to
one year. 173 Extractors not expressly exempted by the commission
must render monthly reports indicating the current and projected
amounts of water extracted or to be extracted 179 and specifying the current water level in each of the reporting extractor's wells. 180 Finally,
the director may request that water samples be taken to analyze water
18 1
quality.
The ordinance empowers the board of supervisors to impose fees
for the administration of the extraction permit system. 182 Such assessments are based on the number of acre feet of pumped groundwater
applied for in each application. The fees are divided into two classes:
(1) local, municipal, and domestic use, in-valley recreational and wildlife enhancement, and local irrigation, and (2) any other use, including
173. Id § 7.01.041(e).
174. Id § 7.01.043(b).
175.

d § 7.01.043(d).

176. Id § 7.01.043(e)-(h).
177. Id § 7.01.043(i).
178.
179.

Id § 7.01.044.
Id § 7.01.050.

180. Id § 7.01.051(a).
181.

Id § 7.01.051(b).

182. Id § 7.01.060.
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transfers to other parts of the basin and export outside the basin. The
first class of fees is set lower than the second to reflect the lower costs of

administering applications for locally used
evaluating 1and
83
groundwater.

Legal Foundations of the Ordinance
Although Inyo is not the first county in California to regulate
groundwater extraction, 184 it is the first to promise immediate influence

on water use. Moreover, because of the ordinance's potential impact,
Los Angeles has brought California's first contemporary legal chal185
lenge to a county's exercise of its police power over groundwater use.
The PolicePower

Article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution confers upon
all cities and counties the power to "make and enforce within [their]

limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations
not in conflict with general laws."' 86 Interpreting the scope of this section, the California Supreme Court stated in Birkenfeld v. City ofBerkeley18 7 that "[a] city's police power under this provision can be applied

only within its own territory and is subject to displacement by general
state law but otherwise is as broad as the police power exercisable by
the Legislature itself."' 88 Examining the scope of judicial review of
183. Id The higher fee, if subsequently established by resolution of the board of supervisors, must relate to the higher administrative cost of evaluating such water use. The higher
fee does not depend on whether the extracted water is exported from the basin, but only on
whether it is not immediately used to recharge the zone of extraction. Id See note 261 &
accompanying text infra.
184. See, e.g., Butte County, Cal., Ordinance 1859; Glenn County, Cal., Ordinance 672;
Imperial County, Cal., Appropriation Ordinance § 56200. All three ordinances are directed
at preventing overdraft by water exporters. The Butte and Glenn ordinances prohibit any
export when the basin is overdrafted, thus enacting the common law rule that appropriators
take only surplus waters from the basin. See notes 34-39 & accompanying text supra. As
such an absolute prohibition could impede the fullest and most beneficial use of water in
contravention of article X, § 2 of the California Constitution, see Hillside Water Co. v. City
of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 677, 76 P.2d 671 (1938), the Imperial ordinance is preferable.
The Imperial ordinance contains no absolute ban on groundwater mining, but rather requires a case-by-case evaluation.
185. The ordinance was immediately challenged by Los Angeles. In City of Los Angeles v. County of Inyo, No. 12883 (Super. Ct. Inyo County, Cal. filed Dec. 30, 1980), the city
raised CEQA and Elections Code claims against the ordinance's procedural enactment;
these claims were rejected. In City of Los Angeles v. County of Inyo, No. 12908 (Super. Ct.
Inyo County, Cal. fied Jan. 16, 1981), the city raised its substantive arguments against the
ordinance; this action is currently pending before the superior court.
186. CAL. CONST. art XI, § 7.
187. 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976).
188. Id at 140, 550 P.2d at 1004, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 473. In Birkenfeld, landlords chal-
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such an exercise of police power, the court tested the challenged measure for its reasonable relationship to a legitimate public purpose. 8 9
The court deemed itself bound to sustain the challenged regulations
under the police power "unless the findings establish a complete absence of even a debatable rational basis for the legislative determination." 90 Furthermore, "[i]n a field of regulation not occupied by
general state law . . . each city is free to exercise its police power to
deal with its own local conditions which may differ from those in other
areas."191
Environmental protection is embraced within the proper objectives of the police power, including action to regulate water use.' 92 In
the 1933 decision of In re Maas, 193 the California Supreme Court expressly validated a county ordinance prohibiting extraction of groundwater for wasteful, unreasonable, or nonbeneficial purposes. In
sustaining the ordinance as a valid exercise of the police power, the
court stated:
Legislation with respect to water affects the public welfare and the
right to legislate in regard to its use and conservation is referable to
the police power of the state. This does not mean, however, that this
phase of the police power is to be exercised exclusively by the state
legislature. .

.

. [T]he conservation of subterranean waters [is] a

194
legitimate field for the exercise of the police power.
The court also noted that the police power of the county is "as broad as
that of the Legislature itself," 195 subject only to the control of general

lenged a rent control ordinance, claiming that it exceeded the city's police power. The landlords asserted that, to justify its exercise of the police power, the city had to show an
emergency condition of housing shortage. Rejecting any requirement than an emergency
condition be demonstrated before use of the police power is permissible, the court stated, "It
is now settled California law that legislation regulating prices or otherwise restricting contractual or property rights is within the police power if its operative provisions are reasonably related to the accomplishment of a legitimate governmental purpose .. ."Id at 158,
550 P.2d at 1022, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 486; see also Wilke & Molzheiser, Inc. v. Department of
Alcoholic Bev. Control, 65 Cal. 2d 349, 359, 420 P.2d 735, 742, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23, 30 (1966);
Allied Properties v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 53 Cal. 2d 141, 146, 346 P.2d
737, 739 (1959).
189. 17 Cal. 3d at 159, 550 P.2d at 1023, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
190. Id at 161, 550 P.2d at 1024, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
191. Id at 163, 550 P.2d at 1026, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
192. Although all property is held subject to the reasonable exercise of the state's police
power, the California Constitution expressly recognizes the power of the state to govern
water use. CAL. CONST. art X, §§ 2, 5; see also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. East
Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 26 Cal. 3d 183, 196-98, 605 P.2d 1, 7-9, 161 Cal. Rptr. 466, 472-74
(1980).

193. 219 Cal. 422, 27 P.2d 373 (1933).
194. Id at 424-25, 27 P.2d at 374.
195. Id at 425, 27 P.2d at 374; see also Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d 162, 176, 339 P.2d
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laws.
More recently, the court of appeal reaffirmed local use of the police power as a basis for groundwater regulation. In Niles Sand and
Gravel Co. v. Alameda County Water District,19 6 a gravel operator
pumped and disposed of water flooding its pits, thus interfering with
the underground water storage program of a county water district. The
district successfully brought suit to enjoin the gravel operator's use of
its land and the underlying water. Citing the 1928 amendment's mandate that all the state's water be conserved and applied only to reasonable and beneficial use, the court held that any damage caused by the
district storage program to the gravel company's rights as overlying
landowner was noncompensable. 197 In support of its holding, the court
cited Gin S. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara198 for the premise that police power regulation does not entail any exercise of the eminent domain provisions of the constitution. Validating the Alameda County
Water District's activities as a legitimate exercise of the police power,
the Niles court noted that the legislature had impliedly conferred such
power in the special act creating the district. 199 Thus, although Niles
reaffirms the police power of the state to regulate the use of groundwater, even in districts whose police powers are more narrowly construed than those of a county, the power to regulate groundwater
extraction would exist even if not expressly granted.
The 1.928 Amendment
Another basis for the authority of a local government agency to
manage groundwater resources lies in the self-executing mandate of the
1928 amendment to the California Constitution.20 0 The California
801, 809 (1959): "Even in matters of statewide concern, the city or county has police power
equal to that of the state so long as the local regulations do not conffict with general laws."
196. 37 Cal. App. 3d 924, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1974).
197. Id at 936-37, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 854-55.
198. 217 Cal. 673, 701, 22 P.2d 5, 16 (1933): "There is a well-recognized and established
distinction between a 'taking' or 'damaging' for public use and the regulation of the use and
enjoyment of a property right for the public benefit. The former falls within the realm of
eminent domain, and the latter within the sphere of the police power. That the [1928] constitutional amendment ... is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state cannot be
questioned." The California Supreme Court reaffirmed this premise in Joslin v. Matin
Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967). See notes 60-66 &
accompanying text supra.
199. 37 Cal. App. 3d at 936-37, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 855. The Alameda County Water
District was formed in 1914 pursuant to the County Water District Law. CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 30000-32200 (West 1971 & Supp. 1981). The district obtained additional powers and
duties in 1961. See Act of Sept. 15, 1961, oh. 1942, 1961 Cal. Stat. 4092.
200. CAL. CONsT. art. X, § 2.
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courts generally have enforced self-executing provisions of the state
constitution. 20 1 As early as 1886, the supreme court noted that such a
° More
provision "requires no legislation to make it more complete. 2 02
recently, the court of appeal stated: "Legislative inaction can in no
manner qualify constitutional provisions capable of self-execution
whose language adequately sets forth the rule through which the duty
20 3
imposed may be enforced."
The California Supreme Court addressed the implications of legislative failure to effectuate a self-executing constitutional mandate in
Chesney v. Byram.204 The constitutional provision at issue in Chesney
granted veterans certain tax advantages. In compelling the county assessor to reduce the tax levied against Chesney, the court observed that
no legislation was required to effectuate the constitutional provision
granting the advantage, because it was self-executing. Absent legislative action, officials of the state's political subdivisions would be primarily responsible for the implementation of the mandate. Absent the
official's recognition of the right guaranteed, the courts would them20 5
selves vindicate the right.
The last sentence of the 1928 amendment expressly states that its
mandate "shall be self-executing, and the Legislature may also enact
laws in the furtherance of [this] policy ..
"2o6 The force and validity
of such a mandate is not curtailed by the legislature's failure to enact
statutes that effectuate the constitutional mandate. Rather, local enforcement by a political subdivision, such as a county, is appropriate
when the state has not acted. Ultimately, when both state and local
authorities fail to implement a constitutional mandate, the public must
resort to the courts.
Preemption
The power of a local entity to regulate groundwater extraction,
201.

See, e.g., Sykes v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 83, 507 P.2d 90, 106 Cal. Rptr. 786

(1973) (constitutional right to speedy trial); Bauer-Schweitzer Malting Co. v. City & County
of San Francisco, 8 Cal. 3d 942, 506 P.2d 1019, 106 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1973) (constitutional

provision requiring assessment of property at full value); Immel v. Langley, 52 Cal. 2d 104,
338 P.2d 385 (1959) (provisions of CAL. ELEC. CODE); Gunn v. California Empl. Dev. Dep't,

94 Cal. App. 3d 658, 165 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1979) (right to privacy); Flood v. Riggs, 80 Cal.
App. 3d 138, 145 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1978) (provisions of CAL. ELEC. CODE); Porten v. Univer-

sity of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976) (right to privacy).
202. Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479, 484, 11 P. 3, 5 (1886).
203.
204.

Unger v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 681, 687, 162 Cal. Rptr. 611, 615 (1980).
15 Cal. 2d 460, 101 P.2d 1106 (1940).

205.

Id at 463, 101 P.2d at 1107-08.

206.

CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
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under authority derived either from the police power or from the 1928
amendment, nevertheless remains subordinate to state regulation that
applies to groundwater. 20 7 A determination of the county's actual authority therefore requires an examination of the preemption doctrine.
A county police power regulation will be deemed preempted if the
reviewing court finds it "in conflict with general laws. ' 20 The Califor20 9
nia courts have found such conflicts to be either express or implied.
An express conflict arises when the legislature provides that there shall
be no local regulation on a particular subject, or when a statute prohibits what an ordinance permits or an ordinance prohibits what a statute
2 10
permits.
. The Inyo County ordinance is not preempted by an express conflict with state law; no state law expressly forbids a county to regulate
groundwater resources. Moreover, the county's ordinance does not
permit what the legislature expressly prohibits. Rather, the ordinance
merely seeks to implement the mandate of the 1928 amendment and
CEQA by endowing a governmental body with the power to define
reasonable and beneficial use and to establish feasible alternatives and
measures preventing unnecessary environmental harm. Finally, the ordinance does not prohibit what state law expressly permits; groundwater appropriation is authorized not by state legislation but by
judicially created and enforced principles, which only establish priorities of use as among competing extractors.
An implied conflict arises when the courts determine that the legislature has completely occupied a field of law. 2 1' Whether the legislature has completely occupied the field, thus impliedly preempting local
regulation, "is a matter which cannot properly be decided upon the
basis pf any single, precise test. '2 12 Legislative intent to preempt will
be inferred from the detail and quantity of state laws pertaining to a
207. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
208. Id Preemption results only when "the legislature has manifested an intention, expressly or by implication, wholly to occupy the field." 5 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNiA LAW 3743-44 (8th ed. 1974).
209. See generally Comment, The California City versus Preemption by Implication, 17
HASTINGS L.J. 603 (1966).
210. Id at 604-05. See, e.g., Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942)
(municipal regulation of highway traffic passing through city streets conflicted with CAL.
VEH. CODE); County of Alameda v. City & County of San Francisco, 19 Cal. App. 3d 750,
97 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1971) (municipal income tax in contravention of CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 50026 (West Supp. 1981)).
211. See, e.g., In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962).
212. Id at 110, 372 P.2d at 903, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
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particular area. 2 13 When the legislature has not completely occupied
the field, additional local regulation may be permitted, provided that it
is both reasonable and appropriate to the needs of a particular locality
and that it is "in aid and furtherance of the purpose of the general
2 14

law."

The California Supreme Court applied a three-part test to determine the existence of implied preemption in Galvan v. Superior
Court:2 15 (1) whether the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; (2) whether the subject matter has been
partially covered by general law that indicates clearly that a paramount
state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or
(3) whether the subject of local action is of such a nature that the adverse effects on transient citizens outweigh the benefits to the local
2 16

area.

In applying the first branch of the test, the court in Galvan rejected
the use of a purely quantitative approach to ascertain the completeness
of state regulation; extensive regulation does not satisfy this criterion.
Rather, the court found the task to be "to determine whether the state
has occupied a relevant field-an area of legislation which includes the
subject of the local legislation, and is sufficiently logically related so
that a court, or a local legislative body, can detect a patterned approach
'2 17
to the subject.
The twenty-one divisions and hundreds of chapters of the Water
Code appear to constitute a fairly extensive statutory system. The legislature's approach to water regulation, however, fails to demonstrate
the patterned approach described in Galvan, especially with respect to
groundwater. For example, appropriation licensing provisions of the
Water Code do not apply to "percolating waters, ' 218 which constitute
nearly all the state's groundwater resources. 2 19 Similarly, although the
Porter-Dolwig Ground Water Basin Protection Law 220 declares that
213.

See Galvan v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 851, 452 P.2d 930, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642

(1969).
214.
215.

Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 370, 125 P.2d 482, 484 (1942).
70 Cal. 2d 851, 452 P.2d 930, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1969).

216. Id at 859-60, 452 P.2d at 935, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 647; see also In re Hubbard, 62 Cal.
2d 119, 128, 396 P.2d 809, 814-15, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398-99 (1964) (municipal gambling

ordinance).
217. 70 Cal. 2d at 862, 452 P.2d at 937, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
218.
219.

See CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1971).
See CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES,

WATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA

220.

BULL. No.

(1980).

CAL. WATER CODE §§ 12920-12924 (West 1971 & Supp. 1981).

118-80,

GROUND-
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"the people" have a primary interest in the correction and prevention
of irreparable damage caused by groundwater overdraft, the PorterDolwig law only commits the state to review and assist local agencies
seeking to accomplish that purpose.2 2 1 Thus, although numerous statutes governing water may be cited, the substantial areas left unregulated exhibit the legislature's intent not to reserve groundwater

management exclusively to state agency regulation.
The legislature has declared that, with respect to planning, "no

general law exists which provides procedures for preparation and adoption of [a comprehensive water resources management] plan. .... 222
Without planning, effective water management cannot be implemented. Thus, without a comprehensive statutory program for water
planning, the field of water resources management cannot be deemed
"fully and completely" covered.

The Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights
Law found that "[t]here are no comprehensive groundwater management programs at the state level," 2 3 but rather that groundwater management "has occurred solely on an ad hoc basis at the local level, in
response to local initiative."2 2 4 The legislature, however, has expressly
declined to create a groundwater management authority or to adopt a

state-supervised groundwater management program. 225 Because of the
substantial areas left unregulated, California water law statutes do not
cover the field so completely as to indicate that the legislature's intent is
to render water resource management exclusively an area of state

agency concern.Z26

Section 12923 anticipates that local agencies, including counties, CAL. WATER
§ 12921.2 (West 1971), will prepare plans to resolve groundwater problems. Thereupon, the Department of Water Resources "may provide" limited technical assistance in
cooperation with the local agency, but only "whenever money has been appropriated for the
purpose." CAL. WATER CODE § 12923 (West 1971).
222. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 25710 (West Supp. 1981). The legislature authorized a specific
planning process for San Mateo County, finding such authorization "necessary and desirable" under the circumstances. Presumably, the legislature had to act because the county
sought joint regulation with incorporated cities and other governmental agencies, including
some not wishing to participate. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 25719 (West Supp. 1981). This
procedure, not needed for a county to exercise its police power exclusively in its own jurisdiction, does not foreclose a county from so acting on its own.
223. FINAL REPORT, supra note 138, at 145.
224. Id
225. See notes 151-52 & accompanying text supra.
226. In contrast to regulation of groundwater extraction, the legislature has specified a
comprehensive regulation of fire protection supply by water districts, see Baldwin Park
County Dist. v. County of Los Angeles, 208 Cal. App. 2d 87,25 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1962), and of
private utilities by the Public Utilities Commission. See California Water & Telephone Co.
v. County of Los Angeles, 253 Cal. App. 2d 16, 61 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1967). In those cases,
221.

CODE
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A determination of the preemption issue under the second branch
of the Ga/van test depends on whether language in the state statutes
reasonably implies a legislative intent to preclude local regulation because of a statewide concern. The Galvan court stated the issue to be
"whether substantial, geographic, economic, ecological or other distinctions are persuasive of the need for local control, and whether local
needs have been adequately recognized and comprehensively dealt
with at the state level. ' '2 27 The answer to this question is found
throughout the Water Code. Rather than addressing local needs in a
uniform and comprehensive state program, the legislature instead has
recognized the variability of local conditions by providing for a variety
of forms of local water resource management. With respect to groundwater, the legislature traditionally has abdicated its lawmaking function, leaving to the judiciary the creation of a somewhat inadequate
228
proprietary system of mutual restraints.
Water Code sections 104 and 105, however, express a general legislative policy that public values rather than proprietary concerns govern and control water use. 229 These broad policy declarations suggest
that, absent specific state regulation, counties hold not only the police
power authority, but also the responsibility to provide needed public
regulation. This conclusion appears inescapable in light of the self-enforcing mandate of the constitution that all waters be devoted to rea230
sonable and nonwasteful use.
Moreover, other provisions of the Water Code illustrate that, when
the state desires exclusive control over an element of water resources,
the legislature does not imply this intent, but declares it expressly. For
example, in regulating dams and reservoirs, the legislature has expressly specified that: "No city or county has authority, by ordinance
enacted by the legislative body thereof or adopted by the people under
the initiative power, or otherwise, to regulate, supervise, or to provide
for the regulation or supervision of any dams or reservoirs .
. 23
Rather than exclusively reserving groundwater management to the
preemption flowed from the legislature's creation of an agency to regulate a specific activity.
Those cases do not apply here, however, because the legislature has created no agency with
authority to regulate Los Angeles's groundwater extractions in Inyo County.
227. Galvan v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d at 863-64, 452 P.2d at 933, 76 Cal. Rptr. at
650 (quoting Robins v. County of Los Angeles, 248 Cal. App. 2d 1, 9, 56 Cal. Rptr. 853, 859
(1967)).
228. See notes 16, 79 & accompanying text supra.
229. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 104, 105 (West 1971).
230. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; see also In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 25
Cal. 3d 339, 351-52, 599 P.2d 656, 663-64, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 357-58 (1979).
231. CAL. WATER CODE § 6026 (West 1971). Even within such exclusive preemption,
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state, the Water Code demonstrates the confined scope of the state's

regulation. No state agency has jurisdiction over the state's groundwater resources in general or over Owens Valley groundwater in particular. The State Water Resources Control Board has only those powers
expressly granted to it by the legislature.232 Generally, the State Board
does not regulate groundwater. 233 The only exceptions arise in the

counties of the south coast basin, where by reason of increasing urban-

2 34
ization the State Board acts as recorder of groundwater extractions

and may act as the moving party to seek judicial injunctions to avoid
seawater intrusion. 235 This selective assignment of passive jurisdiction
to the State Board does not illustrate a paramount state concern that
will not tolerate local regulation.
Similarly, the remaining requirement for finding preemption
under the second branch of the Galvan test cannot be satisfied. For the
Owens Valley, "substantial, geographic, economic, ecological or other

distinctions are persuasive of the need for local control," and "local
needs" have not been "adequately recognized and comprehensively

dealt with at the state level." 236 The Owens Valley's geographic location in the rain shadow of the Sierra requires maintenance of a high

water table to support flora and fauna.2 37 No other major basin in the
state faces this unique ecological dilemma. Substantial geographic, economic, ecological, and other distinctions indicate Inyo County's need
for local management of its local groundwater resources; the state has
not adequately addressed these local needs.
The third and final test of preemption examines whether the adverse effect of the groundwater ordinance on the transient citizens of
the state would outweigh the benefits to Inyo County.238 As the
supreme court in Galvan explained, the "burden on transient citizens"
the state allows county ordinances and regulations concerning dams and reservoirs if such
structures are not subject to regulation by another public body or agency. Id
232. See California School Employees Ass'n v. Personnel Comm'n, 3 Cal. 3d 139, 14344, 474 P.2d 436, 439, 89 Cal. Rptr. 620, 623 (1970); People v. Harter Packing Co., 160 Cal.
App. 2d 464, 467, 325 P.2d 519, 521 (1958).
233. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200, 1250,2500-2501,5100-5101 (West 1971); People v.
Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 306 n.5, 605 P.2d 859, 863 n.5, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30, 34 n.5 (1980).
234. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 4999-5000 (West 1971).
235. See CAL. WATER CODE § 2020 (West 1971).
236. Galvan v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d at 863-64, 452 P.2d at 938, 76 Cal. Rptr. at
650 (quoting Robins v. County of Los Angeles, 248 Cal. App. 2d 1, 9, 56 Cal. Rptr. 853, 859
(1967)).
237. See County of Inyo v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 26 Cal. 3d 154, 156-57, 604 P.2d
566, 567, 161 Cal. Rptr. 172, 173 (1980).
238. See Galvan v. Superior Court, 70 CaL 2d at 860, 452 P.2d at 936, 76 Cal. Rptr. at
647.
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does not describe the final effect on all citizens, but rather the impact of
local ordinance on citizens passing through a locality;2 39 the "burden"
arises from punishment of citizens without their knowingly engaging in
unlawful actions. The Inyo County groundwater ordinance will not
affect transient citizens adversely. The requirement of land ownership
as a precedent to groundwater extraction negates the existence of a
"transient" groundwater extractor.
Los Angeles nonetheless has argued that groundwater cannot be
regulated locally: "Interference of a patch quilt of numerous and perhaps conflicting local regulations on those who have the right and thus
the use [of water], would be intolerable."2 40 A groundwater extraction
ordinance, however, does not expose the city to conflicting regulation
throughout its supply system, because the regulation can apply in only
one location-where the extraction occurs. For extractions within the
county, only one public authority, the county government, can and
does exercise its jurisdiction over extraction. The extracting entity will
be subject to only one regulation in its groundwater extractions. If Los
Angeles also extracts in another county, it would be subject to that
county's separate regulation, which would not apply in Inyo County,
just as Inyo County's regulation would not apply in the other county.
Such local regulation does not produce a preempting conflict, because
2 41
the city can simultaneously comply with each county's regulation.
Finally, opponents of the ordinance cannot argue that "decisional
law" preempts the Inyo County ordinance. First, preemption results
"only where the legislature has manifested an intention, expressly or by
implication, wholly to occupy the field."'242 Second, just as a judicial
boundary determination does not immunize the parties from local zoning regulation of the land to which they are entitled, a judicial apportionment of groundwater among extractors does not immunize each
extractor from police power regulation of its apportioned share. Similarly, a comprehensive state scheme of acquiring rights by use does not
vitiate subsequent local regulation of that use. The "right" to extract
groundwater, which derives from the "use" of groundwater, resembles
the right to land acquired by adverse possession; the owner of a prop239. Id at 864-65, 452 P.2d at 939, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
240. Defendants' response to demurrer at 39, City of Los Angeles v. Board of Supervisors, No. 12908 (Super. Ct. Inyo County, Cal. filed May 15, 1981) (on file with the Hastings
Law Journal).

241. Cf Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (no
preemption when growers can comply simultaneously with both state and federal
regulations).
242. 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 3743-44 (8th ed. 1974).
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erty right acquired by adverse possession can acquire that right only by

use. 243 This form of acquisition results from a uniform, comprehensive
legislative scheme. 244 Having acquired a right in land by use according
to a preemptive legislative scheme, however, the adverse possessor does

not then earn an immunity from future police power regulation by the
local government of the jurisdiction in which the land is located.
Rather, the adverse possessor takes his or her state-derived right sub-

ject to the police power of the state and its political subdivisions.
EqualProtection
The California Constitution prohibits special legislation 245 and
guarantees due process 24 6 and equal protection. 247 The prohibition of
special legislation and the guarantee of equal protection "are essentially the same and, accordingly, are governed by the same standards as
those prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution." 24 8 These principles do not preclude classifications, but require
that they be reasonable. 249
The permit requirement of the ordinance applies to all ground-

water extractors, not just Los Angeles. 250 For example, the City of
Bishop extracts groundwater for its municipal supply from the unincorporated area of the Owens Valley, and will be required to apply for a

permit before continuing to do so. The fact that a municipality other
than Los Angeles remains subject to the ordinance demonstrates that
no single person or entity is 'arbitrarily selected' for application of the
243. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007 (West Supp. 1981).
244. See id; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 321-328, 760.010-.060 (West 1954 & Supp. 1981).
245. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 16. A law is "special" "ifit confers particular privileges
or imposes peculiar disabilities or burdensome conditions, in the exercise of a common right,
upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from the general body of those who stand in
precisely the same relation to the subject of the law." Serve Yourself Gasoline Stations
Ass'ns v. Brock, 39 Cal. 2d 813, 820, 249 P.2d 545, 549 (1952) (footnote omitted), appeal
d'smissed, 345 U.S. 980 (1953); see also Hensley v. Peace Officers Training Fund, 22 Cal.
App. 3d 933, 939, 99 Cal. Rptr. 728, 731 (1972).
246. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
247. See Id
248. Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1, 20, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904, 914 (1971); see also
County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal. 2d 378, 389, 196 P.2d 773, 781
(1948); Durham v. City of Los Angeles, 91 Cal. App. 3d 567, 575, 154 Cal. Rptr. 243, 247
(1979).
249. See Serve Yourself Gasoline Stations Ass'ns v. Brock, 39 Cal. 2d 813, 821, 249 P.2d
545, 549-50 (1952); Hensley v. Peace Officers Training Fund, 22 Cal. App. 3d 933, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 728, 731-32 (1972).
250. See INVo CouNTY, CAL., CODE § 7.01.030 (1980).
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ordinance. 251
The ordinance permits some limited exemptions from the permit
process, but not from the registration and reporting requirements; these
exemptions, however, rest on a rational ground. Permit exemptions
can be granted for extractors of less than five acre-feet of water per year
for their own use within the basin and for extractors who irrigate less
than twenty acre-feet, but no more than one hundred acre-feet, of their
own land on the surface of the basin. 252 These minor quantities do not
measurably affect the basin; moreover, the small amount of water extracted will recharge the basin in the areas of the extraction. In light of
the administrative costs that permit applications would require of both
the small applicant and the county's resources, these exemptions appear to be rational. 253 Furthermore, the ordinance provides a mechanism for terminating exemptions should the water director find that
"the extraction in question or cumulative effect of exempted extractions
produced a significant negative effect on the environment." 254 The ordinance is thus rational both on its face and as applied in its future
operation.
The ordinance's severability clause also rationally corresponds to
the law's goal. This clause releases all extractors from any provisions
held inapplicable to "any person that has extracted more than onethird of the groundwater extracted from the Owens Valley Groundwater Basin" in the ten years prior to the adoption of the ordinance.2 5
Inyo County seeks through its ordinance to protect and preserve its
environment and groundwater resources; the means chosen include
both a groundwater management plan and regulation of those who use
groundwater. If Inyo County could not regulate an extractor who accounted for at least one-third of the historical extractions, however, a
significant portion of the Owens Valley's groundwater would fall
outside the scope of the ordinance; the management plan, although
comprehensive in theory, would become useless in fact. The excluded
extractor could pump with unfettered discretion. Efforts to effectuate
the ordinance's purposes by restraining other extractions might prove
fruitless and might incur the risk of imposing an undue restraint on
those still regulated, to compensate for the large, unregulated pumper.
251. Cf Whittaker v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 357, 368, 438 P.2d 358, 367 (1968) ("a
classification . . . will not be rejected unless plainly arbitrary").
252. INYO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 7.01.070 (1980).
253. Cf CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2100, 2102 (West 1971) (excepting from adjudication
proceedings extractors of 10 acre-feet or less of groundwater).
254. INYO COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 7.01.071 (1980).
255. Id § 7.01.200.

March 1982]

GROUNDWATER

Accordingly, to ensure that Inyo County governs well or not at all, rationally the ordinance must apply to at least two-thirds of the basin.
The water table standard, requiring maintenance of the water table "at a depth that will not cause excessive drilling or pumping costs
for other groundwater users, ' 256 reasonably relates to the stated goals
of the ordinance to reverse the desertification of the Owens Valley and
to preserve groundwater for the perpetual use of all extractors. 257 The
county found, after years of study, that to sustain the Owens Valley's
natural vegetation and wildlife, the groundwater basin must be restored
and maintained; more than any other factor, the lowering of the water
table has produced the adverse changes witnessed to date. 25 8 Maintenance of a high water table therefore reasonably relates to the subirriair quality as well as a
gation of the natural vegetation and promotes
259
life-sustaining habitat on the valley floor.
Moreover, the ordinance does not offend the special legislation or
equal protection clauses in setting up a two-class structure in which one
class pays higher fees.2 60 As expressed in the ordinance, this structure
derives from the fact that it is more expensive to evaluate a permit that
involves either a change in related surface water use or the use of
groundwater out of its locality of extraction. The less expensive class
embraces extractors whose use of the groundwater will cause immediate recharge of the area of extraction and will not require the identification of separate surface water to offset the recharge.
Assessments decreased for those persons who reduce the costs of
government administration do not violate the equal protection
clause.2 6 1 The Inyo County Water Department and Commission will
be required to devote greater effort to analyze and adjudicate a permit
application that involves either related surface water or the transport of
256. Id § 7.01.030(d).
257. Id § 7.01.010(b), (d).
258. Id § 7.01.010; see P. WILLIAMS, CHANGES

IN THE OWENS VALLEY SHALLOW

GROUNDWATER LEVELS FROM 1970 TO 1978 ii-iii (1978).

259. In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), the United States
Supreme Court upheld a conservation statute regulating groundwater pumping that was far
more discriminating and burdensome than Inyo County's ordinance. Among other things,
that statute flatly prohibited pumping water for its carbonic gas content. The Court found
that the differences "between pumping from wells penetrating the rock and pumping from
those not penetrating it, and between pumping for the purpose of collecting and vending the
gas apart from the waters and pumping for other purposes" justified the classifications. Id
at 80.
260. INYo CoUNTY, CAL., CODE § 7.01.060 (1980).
261. See Richfield Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 169 Cal. App. 2d 331, 337, 337 P.2d
237, 241 (1959) (sustaining a classification based on differing administrative cost and
burdens).
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groundwater to another part of the basin than will be required to assess
the net effect of extracting groundwater for immediate use in the locality of extraction. In assessing the ecological impact of groundwater
transferred, the county also must assess transmission and evapo-transpiration losses, whereas these losses need not be assessed with reference to groundwater placed in immediate local use. In assessing the
impact of groundwater extraction related to changes in surface diversions, the county must assess not only the extraction impact, but also
the surface water impact, and then must correlate the two different impacts to determine the net impact. The two-tiered structure rationally
enables the county to impose fees on the applicants in proportion to the
county's costs in evaluating their applications.
MunicialAffairs
The California Constitution accords to chartered cities the power
to "make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs" without state legislative intrusion. 262 The constitutional
protection afforded chartered cities raises two questions: first, whether
Los Angeles extraterritorial water-gathering activities are "municipal
affairs" within the meaning of the California Constitution; second, if
these activities are municipal affairs, whether a chartered city may rely
upon the municipal affairs doctrine to violate the express constitutional
mandate that all the state's water be put to reasonable and beneficial
use. Although the answers to these questions do not directly affect a
determination of the theoretical power of local governments to regulate
groundwater extraction, the municipal affairs doctrine is relevant because Los Angeles, California's largest municipal water user, is a
263
chartered city.
The scope of the municipal affairs doctrine was examined by the
264
California Supreme Court in City of Santa Clara v. Von Raesfeld.
The court held that the issuance of revenue bonds to finance a joint
water pollution control facility to serve Santa Clara and several other
cities was a "question of statewide concern and therefore controlled by
the applicable state law. ' 265 The court reasoned that, although the
treatment and disposal of sewage historically has been considered a
municipal affair, such projects
may transcend the boundaries of one or several municipalities. Such
262. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (West Supp. 1981).
263. See Los Angeles City Charter.
264. 3 Cal. 3d 239, 474 P.2d 976, 90 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1970).
265. Id at 245, 474 P.2d at 979, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 11.

March 1982]

GROUNDWATER

projects also may affect matters which are acknowledged to be of
statewide concern; e.g., protection of navigable waters. . . and the
public health. . . . In such circumstances the project ceases to be a
municipal affair and comes within
266the proper domain and regulation
of the general laws of the state.
The court's analysis appears to rest on the premise that, when municipal activities have impacts or "costs" borne by entities outside the territory of the chartered city, such activities become matters of statewide
26 7
concern and therefore amenable to the provisions of the general law.
The California Supreme Court also has addressed the dual roles of
In City of South Pasadena v. Pasadena
municipality-proprietor.
the
Land& Water Co. ,268 a private water company sought to sell its water
system to the City of Pasadena. As the company also served South
Pasadena and its residents, South Pasadena objected to the sale. In
resolving the issue whether Pasadena would enjoy municipal discretion
over the South Pasadena sector of the system, the court explained the
distinctly proprietary role that Pasadena would play and the consequent amenability of Pasadena to South Pasadena's regulation:
The powers of the two cities in regard to this water service will be
separate and distinct, one will be subordinate to the other, and,
hence, there will not be two cities exercising the same powers in the
same territory at the same time. South Pasadena, within its own limits, will be the sole representative of sovereignty in the fixing of rates,
and in the supervision of the
2 69streets; and Pasadena will be subject
thereto, as a private person.
Considered within the framework of these standards, Los Angeles's water-gathering activities in Inyo County cannot be viewed as a
municipal affair. Inyo County suffers substantial economic and environmental costs because of Los Angeles's water extractions. 270 Absent
Inyo County's groundwater ordinance, the LADWP cannot be held responsible to those upon whom the burden of its activities is cast. Moreover, the California Constitution expressly declares that regulation of
water use is a matter of statewide concern.2 71 Finally, the LADWP
266. Id at 246, 474 P.2d at 980, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
267. Professor Sato, analyzing the standard adopted by the court, stated that the "extraterritorial effects" limitation on municipal affairs power is "hardly a novel proposition....
In the absence of any external institutional control, the municipal decison-makers, because
they are not responsible to those upon whom the burden is cast, would be subject to no
restraint in exporting costs, except, possibly, a fear of retaliation. Such a chaotic situation
cannot be tolerated in an ordered society." Sato, "Municopal Affairs" in California, 60
CALIF. L. REv. 1055, 1076 (1972).
268. 152 Cal. 579, 93 P. 490 (1908).
269. Id at 593, 93 P. at 497.
270. See notes 83-85 & accompanying text supra.
271. See CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. The fact that water use is a matter of statewide con-
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carries out its extraction program not as an act of governance over the
people of Los Angeles, but rather in its capacity as a proprietary landowner inInyo County. Thus, the LADWP's water-gathering program
in Inyo County fits within the class of activities excluded from munici272
pal affairs protection.
If the LADWP's extraction program were a municipal affair and
thus were protected from legislative interference, the exercise of such a
power by a chartered city would nonetheless be subject to the constitution's general requirement that all the state's water be put to reasonable
and beneficial use. 273 Basic rules of construction require that constitutional provisions be construed to avoid a conflict;274 in the case of an

unavoidable conflict, the constitutional provision that is more specific
and that is adopted most recently prevails. 275 Parallel provisions of the
constitution expressly provide for state police power regulation of a
city's water-gathering activities. Article X, section 5 specifies that the
use of all water remains subject to the regulation and control of the
state. 276 Article X, section 2 provides that all water-including that
gathered by municipalities-must be extracted and used reasonably.
Thus, notwithstanding the general authority of a city to undertake municipal functions, that authority is circumscribed by the specific constitutional constraints pertaining to water use. Accordingly, the police
power of the state extends to municipal water-gathering activities;
nothing in the "municipal affairs" authorization conflicts with such regulation. Applying all sections of the constitution together, the LADWP
is authorized to extract water, but it remains subject to the police power
in that extraction.
Constitutional conflict between Los Angeles's municipal affairs
power and the 1928 amendment's requirement that all water be placed
to reasonable and beneficial use can be avoided by conforming the
LADWP's exercise of that power to the amendment's mandate. A
complete abrogation of the city's autonomy is unnecessary; the Inyo
County ordinance demonstrates that the LADWP can continue to rely
cern does not vitiate Inyo County's power to enact the ordinance. Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal.
2d 162, 176, 339 P.2d 801 (1959). See also note 195 & accompanying text supra.
272. Affording absolute municipal affairs immunity to Los Angeles's water extraction
program would insulate the LADWP from all state regulation, including the Water Code
itself. See Bishop v. City of San Jose, I Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969).
273. See CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. See notes 200-06 & accompanying text supra.
274. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 596, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601, 609, (1971), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
275. Id
276. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 5.
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upon its extraction program for a large part of its water supply by rendering such use reasonable through implementation of long-range conservation and environmental protection plans.
Conclusion
The 1976-77 drought demonstrated that California's most vital resource is water. Yet, as the Governor's Commission recognized, California's water remains inadequately protected by law. 277 This dilemma
has given rise to environmental abuse, public strife, and costly litigation in at least one California county-Inyo.
The Inyo County groundwater extraction ordinance seeks to avoid
the undesirable results of the state's failure to act. The county's regulatory implementation of the constitutional mandate of article X, section
2 effectively transfers the initial determination whether a use is reasonable and beneficial from a distant, single-purpose water department to
a local authority with general powers. This local authority, the County
of Inyo, also is charged under the police power with the protection of
the health and well-being of the citizens it serves. In contrast, the distant Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, although the major
landowner and principal taxpayer in Owens Valley, has only one purpose-to acquire water at the lowest possible cost to its subscribers.
The ordinance also removes the burden of substantive regulation
of water use from an already overtaxed judiciary. Although any determination whether the use is reasonable and beneficial will depend on
the facts in each case, the more efficient approach to such factfinding,
analysis, and adjudication relies upon the informal procedures of an
administrative .body.278 Only when administrative procedures fail to
produce a mutually agreeable result should resort to the judiciary be
sanctioned. The judiciary should not itself govern, as in past adjudications, but should only oversee the exercise of discretion by the executive and legislative departments. Furthermore, the ordinance properly
removes the burden of proof from the shoulders of an agency charged
with representing the public interest in water and places that burden
277.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 138, at 145; see also CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON WATER,

PARKS, AND WILDLIFE, DEVELOPING A WATER PLAN FOR CALIFORNIA PART IV: WATER

RIGHTS, REP. No. 754, 1979-80 Sess. 7-11 (1979) (remarks of Commissioner James A.

Cobey: "There are no provisions for the comprehensive management of groundwater basins
throughout the state.").
278. The last major groundwater adjudication in California required twenty years to
determine the rights of the parties. See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 24 Cal.
3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975). Similarly, the Inyo County CEQA litigation
now approaches its tenth year.
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upon parties whose sole purpose is to obtain ever greater quantities of a
scarce resource. Whether and to what extent this approach may reduce
the need for lengthy litigation is a question that only experience with
the new ordinance can answer. The shift in burden of presentation and
the presumption of regularity attaching to the county's actions should
render litigation sufficiently unappealing to induce compromise in its
place.
In the final analysis, the burden of determining whether a particular administrative regulation of water use meets the high standards for
protection of the public interest in water rests with the judiciary. The
judiciary ultimately must define and implement the constitutional mandate of article X, section 2. Inyo County properly seeks to facilitate this
judicial function by providing a source of data, policy, and decision
that, if properly compiled and applied, will avoid the need for resort to
litigation in all but the most difficult cases. Just as the Inyo ordinance
establishes a legal precedent for others to follow, so now must the
county in its administration set an example of fairness and competence
that also proves worthy of emulation.
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APPENDIX

AN ORDINANCE TO REGULATE THE EXTRACTION OF GROUNDWATER
WITHIN THE OWENS VALLEY GROUNDWATER BASIN
Section 1. The people of the County of Inyo do ordain as follows:
CHAPTER 7.01
GROUNDWATER EXTRACTION
Section 7.01.010 Declaration of findings and purpose.
The Board of Supervisors does hereby find and declare as follows:
(a) The groundwater basin of the Owens Valley has historically supplied the people and land of
Inyo County with spring flow water and a high water table, which has sustained vegetation and
wildlife in an otherwise desert environment.
(b) The groundwater basin of the Owens Valley forms a significant water resource of the State
of California, which must be managed in trust for the benefit of the State's entire population, and
must be conserved so that it may be perpetually placed to the reasonable and beneficial use of all
its potential users.
(c) The groundwater basin of the Owens Valley must be managed and operated for the maximum
long-range benefit of the environment, as well as for municipal and agricultural uses, by removing
and mitigating all adverse envircnmental effects caused by groundwater extraction and surface
water diversion by whatever feasible means are available.
(d) In recent years the groundwater basin of the Owens Valley has not been managed inconsonance with the findings declared in (a), (b)and (c) above, as a consequence of which unnecessary
and excessive drawdown of the groundwater table has occurred. Together with other adverse
environmental effects, producing detriment to the people, health and economy of the County of Inyo,
the lowering of the water table has directly led to a loss of vegetation and indirectly to a reduction
inirrigated acreage. As a consequence of the recent environmental changes, the California Department of Water Resources in Bulletin 118-80 has identified the Owens Valley as an area of special
concern.
(e) Inyo County has a paramount right and duty to govern the management and extraction of
resources within its jurisdiction in order to protect the health, welfare and safety of the citizens of
Inyo County.
(f) In order to protect its people, environment and economy, the County of Inyo must adopt a
systematic regulation of extractions from the groundwater basin of the Owens Valley; this regulation
must consider environmental and economic factors in the area of origin and the area of use, coordinated use of surface and groundwater resources, and the implementation of water conservation
and other feasible -preferred alternatives to extraction.
(g) To implement the systematic regulation of groundwater extractions, the County of Inyo must
undertake the preparation of a water management plan for both groundwater and the inherently
integrated surface water resources of the Owens Valley.
Section 7.01.020 Definitions and Establishments.
(a) "Director" means the Director of the Inyo County Water Department, hereby established by
enactment of this ordinance. The Director will be appointed by the Board of Supervisors to serve at
its pleasure and will report to the County Administrative Officer of the County of Inyo. The Director
is empowered to employ such staff as necessary and approved by the Board of Supervisors.
(b) "Administration of the extraction permit application" includes the processing and evaluation of
all permit applications, inspection of the execution of permits that have been granted, the performance of technical studies necessary to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, the performance
of professional services necessary to execute the purposes of this chapter, and the preparation of a
water management plan.
(c) "Water Management Plan" refers to a document to be prepared by the Inyo County Water
Department and approved by the Inyo County Board of Supervisors; the plan will address the
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extraction and allocation of the groundwater of the Owens Valley and the correlative distribution of
that basin's surface water, the plan will form the basis for the approval, denial, and/or terms and
conditions of each groundwater extraction permit
(d) "Water Commission" or "Commission" refers to a board appointed by the Board of Supervisors pursuant to this ordinance. The Commission shall be composed of five members, all residents in
the Owens Valley Groundwater Basin Each member of the Water Commission will be appointed for
a term of four years with the initial periods of appointment determined by lot to produce staggered
terms
(e) "Person" means any person, firm, corporation, or governmental agency (except the United
States government to the extent that federal law preempts this ordinance)
(f) 'Groundwater" means all water contained within the zone of saturation
(g) "Owens Valley Groundwater Basin" means that area of the Owens Valley within the County
of Inyo, California beginning at the intersection of the Mono County Line and the western boundary
of the Inyo Range portion of the Inyo National Forest, thence generally southerly and easterly along
the western boundary of the Inyo Range portion of the Inyo National Forest to the intersection of
the southerly boundary of the Inyo Range portion of the Inyo National Forest and the eastern boundary of Range 36 East; thence southerly along the eastern boundary of Range 36 East to the southern boundary of Township 14 South. thence along a line bearing 135 degrees to the intersection of
that line with the eastern extension of the southern boundary of Township 16 South, thence westerly along the southern boundary of Township 16 South and its extension to the intersection of that
boundary with the eastern boundary of the Sierra Nevada Range portion of the Inyo National Forest.
thence generally northerly along the eastern boundary of the Sierra Nevada Range portion of the
Inyo National Forest to the intersection of that boundary with the Mono County Line. thence easterly along the Mono County Line to the point of beginning
(h) "Groundwater extraction" means removal of groundwater by artificial means from the groundwater basin, or reduction by artificial means of natural recharge from surface water into the groundwater basin.
(i) "Groundwater table" means the level of the surface of saturation within the aquifer
(j) "Well" means any artificial excavation constructed by any method for the purpose of extracting water from or injecting water into the underground, for making tests or observations of underground conditions, or any other wells whose regulation is necessary to fulfill the purpose of this
chapter. Wells shall not include:
1. Oil and gas wells, except those wells converted to use as water wells, or
2. Wells used for the purpose of:
a. Dewatering excavation during construction, and
b. Stabilizing hillside or earth embankments.
3. Test or exploratory holes for soil testing, mineral exploration; or seismic exploration where such
holes are less than twenty-five feet deep; and
4. Holes or excavation for soil percolation tests where such holes are less than ten feet deep
Section 701.030 Water Management Plan and Groundwater Extraction Standards.
This ordinance shall authorize the County of Inyo to undertake the preparation of a Water Management Plan for the groundwater and related surface water resources of the Owens Valley and to
develop groundwater extraction standards. Both surface and groundwater will be :ncluded in the
water management plan to the extent that they are interchangeable in terms of their use. The
water management plan will identify and quantify the water resources of the Owens Valley Groundwater Basin and will specify water use programs which are consistent with the health and welfare
of the County's citizens and, to the extent feasible, with the County's land use plans and the needs
of the parties holding water rights. The Water Management Plan and all permits and exemptions
granted pursuant to this chapter, to the extent practically feasible, shall be consistent with and shall
implement the following groundwater extraction standards.
(a) The paramount protection of Inyo County's citizens, environment and economy.
(b) Correction or mitigation of observed significant environmental damage.
(c) Maintenance of the groundwater table at a depth that will support natural vegetation and
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wildlife, minimize air pollution and enable natural springs to flow.
(d) Maintenance of the groundwater table at a depth that will not cause excessive drilling or
pumping costs for other groundwater users.
(e) Preservation of groundwater quality.
(f) Imposition, whenever feasible, of measures to avoid or mitigate anticipated adverse environmental effects, including but not limited to the use of surface water in the Owens Valley Groundwater Basin.
(g) Satisfaction of the needs of the extractor, taking into consideration the extractor's alternative
sources of supply and its conservation policies and practices.
(h) Satisfaction to the extent feasible of the needs of the agricultural sector of the Owens Valley
through the distribution of water for local irrigation and to increase the acreage devoted to agriculture other than open range.
i) Reduction in the extent to which ground levels sink as a consequence of groundwater extraction.
(j) Consideration of the needs and practices of all water users in the state, and the status of the
state's entire water resources.
(k) Consideration of guidance received from governmental agencies other than the applicant.
(I) Results and adequacy of the extractor's environmental monitoring program.
Section 7.01.031 Plan: Process.
The Director and his staff andlor consultants will draft the Water Management Plan; the Commission will review the document and hold public workshops, and stipulate modifications as necessary.
The Plan will be approved by the Board of Supervisors only after the Commission has completed its
review and the Board has held public hearings. No more than nine (9) months will elapse between
the authorization of this ordinance and approval of the Plan by the Board of Supervisors, unless the
Board of Supervisors determines that there is good cause for an extension of the time necessary for
preparing the Water Management Plan. The Plan can be modified as needed, but only as authorized
by the Board of Supervisors after the appropriate public hearings. Both the Water Commission and
the Board of Supervisors may recomriiend modifications.
Section 7.01.040 Permit.
No person, firm, corporation, or governmental agency (except an agency of the United States
government to the extent federal law preempts this ordinance), shall within the Owens Valley
Groundwater Basin extract water from that basin by any artificial means without first obtaining a
written permit as provided for in this chapter.
Section 7.01.041 Permit: Application.
An extractor of groundwater shall file its application for a permit to the Director of the Inyo
Water Department and in that application shall include the following data for the pumping year ending on March 31 of the year following the year of application.
(a) Location, maximum extraction rate, depth and all other information required in the Water Well
Drillers Report (Section 13750, California Water Code) of each well including observation wells owned
or controlled by the extractor.
(b) Location, planned monthly extraction rate, and depth of each well proposed for operations.
(c) Delineation of the time periods within the Owens Valley Groundwater Basin in which each well
is proposed for operation.
(d) Description of the adverse environmental effects of the extraction, by individual well, groups
of wells (if applicable), and by the extractor's entire operation.
(e) Proposed or feasible use or change in related operations of surface water, if any, including
uses designed to mitigate or eliminate the adverse environmental effects described in (d)above.
(f) Intended beneficial use of the extracted groundwater and related surface supplies, by individual wells, groups of wells (if applicable), and by the entirety of the extractor's operation.
(g) A description by quantification and location of each end use of the needs of the extractor
which the extraction is designed to meet.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

(h) A description of alternatives available to the extractor to meet the needs described in (g)
above, including specitications and quantitication of the alternative of water conservation
Section 7 01 042 Permit Process During Interim PeriodIn the time period between the enactment of this ordinance and the final approval of the Water
Management Plan, Inyo County will implement an interim permit process for groundwater pumping
All persons extracting groundwater must submit the necessary application and data as required
under Section 7 01 041 of this ordinance within thirty (30) days of notification by the Department
Notification shall be provided by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Inyo County,
and posting at the Courthouse in Independence and the County Services Building in Bishop No more
than three (3) weeks after receipt of the applications, the Director will recommend approval, denial.
or approval with stipulated conditions of the permit to the Commission No sooner than three (3)
weeks after the receipt of the applications, the Commission will hold public hearings on all those
applications to extract groundwater which have been timely received Within two (2) weeks after the
close of the hearings, the Commission shall issue its decision conditionally granting or conditionally
denying each application The permits will be conditional pending completion of the Water Management Plan In reaching its decision the Commission shall be bound by the standards set forth in
Section 7 01 030 above There will be no appeal from the interim decisions of the Commission
Section 7 01 043 Permit Process After Adoption of Water Plan
Permit application shall be made, reviewed, and adludicated according to the following process
(a) Not later than one month after the adoption of the water management plan, and not later
than February 1 of each calendar year thereafter, the applicant shall submit to the Water Department five (5) copies of its application for extraction as described above The application form shall
be developed by the Director and shall be made available to all potential applicants The Director, for
good cause, may increase the number of copies required
(b) Within three (3) working days after the time for filing applications has passed, the Director
shall forward a copy of each application, together with a request for guidance or comments, to the
affected county departments including but not limited to, the District Attorney, the County Counsel,
the Planning Department, the Public Works Department, the County Health Officer and the Agricultural Commissioner of Inyo County, and to the Department of Water Resources. State Water
Resources Control Board, South Lahontan Regional Water Quality Control Board, Great Basin Air
Pollution Control District, U S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management. Inyo-Mono Association
of Government Entities and any other governmental agency requesting such opportunity
(c) Upon receipt of the permit application, the Director shall review the application with the
affected county departments including those listed in (b) above
(d) Not later than six (6) weeks after the date on which applications are due, the Director shall
prepare a recommendation to the Commission for approval, denial and/or the enforcement of specific
terms and conditions of each groundwater pumping permit application. The Director may recommend
that the application be placed on a consent calendar. The Director's recommendation shall be consistent with the groundwater management plan and shall be based upon a review of hydrologic,
environmental and economic consequences of the proposed groundwater pumping
(e) No sooner than eight (8) weeks after the date on which applications are due, the Inyo County
Water Commission will hold public hearings on all applications to extract groundwater which have
been timely received As soon as the time for filing applications has passed, and in no event less
than seven (7) days prior to this hearing, the applicants shall be notified of public hearings on
groundwater extraction applications and notices of these hearings and a description of all applications received shall be published in at least one newspaper of general circulation in Inyo County, and
posted in the Courthouse in Independence and the County Services Building in Bishop
(f) At the public hearings conducted by the County Water Commission, the Director shall present
his recommendations. The applicant, any affected federal, state or local agency, any person
adversely affected by the application, and any citizens of the County of Inyo may appear to testify.
in writing or orally or both, in favor or against the application. The hearings will remain open for a
maximum of two (2) weeks.
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(g) If an application appears on the consent calendar recommended by the Director and no
member of the Commission objects, that application, without further proceedings described in subdivision (f) through (m)of this section, shall be deemed approved. If any member of the Commission
objects to an item on the consent calendar, it shall be removed from that calendar and subject to
the hearings and determination process of this section.
(h) Within three (3)weeks after the close of the hearings described above, the Commission shall
issue its decision granting, denying, or conditionally granting each application. Three affirmative
votes shall be required to grant or conditionally grant an application. In rendering its decision, the
Commission shall be bound by the standards set forth in Section 7.01.030 above and the Water
Management Plan. If a permit is granted, it shall designate for each well the amounts of groundwater extraction authorized in the term of the permit.
(i) Within fourteen (14) days after the Commission renders its decision, the applicant or any person adversely affected by the application, upon payment of a reasonable fee set by resolution of the
Board of Supervisors, may appeal the Commission's decision to the Board of Supervisors. Said
appeal shall be in writing and shall specify in detail the grounds on which the appeal is based.
(j) No later than fourteen (14) days after the filing of the last of any appeals permitted by this
section, the Board of Supervisors shall conduct a public hearing of any applications so appealed;
provided, however, that notice of the time and place of such hearing shall be provided at least
seven (7) days in advance to the applicant and any person requesting such notice and by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Inyo County, and posting at the Courthouse in Independence and the County Services Building in Bishop. Prior to commencement of the hearing, the Board
may dismiss any appeal found to be lacking in substance.
(k) The record of the Commission hearing shall be incorporated as the record of the Board hearing, although the Board may call witnesses if it so desires, and shall receive other testimony or
records presented to it. In determining each application, the Board of Supervisors shall be bound by
the same standards that apply to the Commission as specified in subdivision (h)of this section.
(I) The filing of an appeal pursuant to this section shall not stay the decision of the Commission
being appealed, unless the Board of Supervisors for good cause states in writing orders such a stay
pending its own determination of the application.
(m) The Board shall hear the appeal(s) for not more than two (2)weeks and render a final decision not more than two (2) weeks after the conclusion of its public hearing. Three affirmative votes
shall be required to modify, reverse or vacate the decision of the Commission.
Section 7.01.044 Permit: Duration.
Each permit for extraction issued shall be effective for a period not to exceed one (1) year, commencing no earlier than April 1st of each year. All permits shall expire on March 31st of the subsequent year, except those expressly exempted by the Commission.
Section 7.01.045 Permit: Modification.
By application filed on May 1st, August 1st, or November 1st, a groundwater extractor, or the
Director on his or her own motion, may seek modification of a permit in accordance with tMe procedure outlined in Section 7.01.042 above. A permit may be modified to increase or decrease the
amounts, location, times of extraction, or use of groundwater.
Section 7.01.050 Reports: Extraction.
Each groundwater extractor to whom a permit for extraction has been granted, unless expressly
exempted by the Commission, shall, for the terms of that permit, render monthly reports as follows:
(a) By the 15th of each month of the permit year, a report listing each well operated, the quantity of water extracted by each well during the preceding month; projected amounts of water to be
extracted from each well and from all the extractor's wells inclusive for each month of the remainder of the permit year; and the use and location of use of the extracted groundwater from each well
and the related surface water.
Section 7.01.051 Reports: Environmental Monitoring.
Unless expressly exempted by the Water Commission:
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(a) Each groundwater extractor shall provide by the 15th of each month a recoro of water level
measurements taken in the preceding month in all operating and observation wells under the control
of the extractor. All measurements shall be made in a manner approved by the Director.
(b) Each groundwater extractor shall allow the Director to analyze water quality samples taken
from those wells and at those periods specified by the Director. All samples shall be taken in a
manner approved by the Director.
(c) Each groundwater extractor shall provide all other such reports as reasonably required by the
Director.
Section 7.01.060 Fees.
The Board of Supervisors by resolution shall adopt fees for administration of the extraction permit
system, which fees shall be assessed annually against each person, firm, corporation, or governmental agency (except an agency of the United States government to the extent that federal law
preempts this ordinance), which owns or controls a well within the Owens Valley Groundwater Basin.
The assessments shall be based upon the number of acre feet of pumped groundwater applied for in
the application, and shall only be used for administration of the water management plan and the
groundwater extraction permit system, including maintenance of a reasonable reserve. Fees shall be
in two classes: the first class for applications to extract water for local municipal and domestic use,
in-valley recreational and wildlife enhancement, and local irrigation, provided that no surface diversions are affected; and the second class for applications to extract water for all other uses Fees of
the first class shall be set lower than fees of the second class, to compensate for the lower costs
of evaluating and administering applications of the first fee class.
Section 7.01.070 Exemption. General.
Each of the following extractors is hereby declared to be exempt from the reporting provision of
Sections 7.01.050 and 7.01.051, except the initial registration of wells, well location, intended amount
of annual extraction, intended use, and location of use of the groundwater.
(a) Any extractor who in any year commencing April 1 extracts less than five (5) acre feet and
devotes that extraction to its own reasonable and beneficial use in the Owens Valley Groundwater
Basin and does not sell or exchange water to other users.
(b) Any extractor who does not sell or exchange water and who extracts for irrigation for agriculture on the surface of the Owens Valley Groundwater Basin an area of less than twenty (20) acres.
not to exceed a total of one hundred (100) acre feet of groundwater per year
Section 7.01.071 Exemptions: Modifications.
The Director may recommend further exemptions but only the Commission may grant further
exemptions. However, the Director also may recommend the removal of any exemption authorized
by this chapter if he or she finds in writing that the extraction in question or cumulative effect of
exempted extractions produced a significant negative effect on the environment. Only the Commission may remove an exemption and only then after a duly noticed public hearing. Any person denied
an exemption pursuant to this section may appeal said decision to the Board of Supervisors which
by a vote of three or more members may grant the appeal and declare the exemption.
Section 7.01.080 Inspection.
The Director or his or her representative, with good cause, may at any and all reasonable times
enter any and all places, property, enclosures and structures, for the purposes of making examinations and investigations to determine whether any provision of this chapter is being violated. Upon
twenty-four (24) hours notice, all extractors shall make available to the Director of the Inyo County
Water Department or his or her representative, at the extractor's principal place of business or other
convenient location within the Owens Valley, the original of all logs, reports, data, analysis of data.
or other records maintained on their groundwater extractions.
Section 7.01.090 Violation: Stop Order.
In the event that an extraction is taking place contrary to the terms of this chapter, the Director
may order the extraction stopped by posting a stop order at the site of the unauthorized extraction.
No further extraction shall take place after the posting of the stop order until such time as the stop
order is removed by the Director.
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Section 7.01.100 Violation: Civil Penalty.
Any extractor who violates any provision of this chapter, whether or not a stop order has been
issued, shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $500.00 per acre-foot of water unlawfully
extracted.
Section 7.01.101 Violation: Criminal Penalty.
Any person who violates any provision of this chapter with intent to do so, whether or not a stop
order has been issued, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by fine not exceeding $500.00
per violation, or by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)months, or by both such fine and imprisonment; and any extractor shall be deemed guilty of a separate offense for each and every day or
portion thereof during which any such violation is committed, continued, or permitted, and for each
and every separate well with which any such violation is committed, continued, or permitted; and for
each such subject violation of day or well, shall be subject to the same punishment as for the original offense.
Section 7.01.200 Severability.
If a court of competent jurisdiction holds this Chapter or any of its provisions invalid, or application of this Chapter or any of its provisions invalid as to any person, the remaining valid portions of
this Chapter and its valid application to other persons shall continue in full force and effect, to the
end that portions or applications held invalid shall be severable; but if this Chapter or any provision
of this Chapter is held inapplicable to any person that has extracted more than one-third of the
groundwater extracted from the Owens Valley Groundwater Basin in the 10 years preceding the
enactment of this Chapter, then, for the duration of that holding, that portion of this Chapter held
inapplicable to such an extractor shall become inapplicable to all extractors, to the end that any portion of this Chapter not applicable to at least one-third of the groundwater extraction shall be
inapplicable to all. In the event that Section 7.01.060 is declared invalid because it establishes fees
of two classes, that Section shall be then deemed reenacted to provide for all fees to be of a single
class.
Section 7.01.201 Amendments.
The Board of Supervisors may amend this chapter or any of its provisions.
Section 2. Upon enactment of Chapter 7.01, the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors will pursuant to
the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970 immediately file with the County Clerks of Inyo and
Los Angeles Counties a negative declaration based upon the initial study dated May 19, 1980, prepared by the County's planning consultants.

